



WHEN STATUTORY REGIMES COLLIDE: 
WILL CITIZENS UNITED AND WISCONSIN RIGHT TO LIFE MAKE 




In Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission (2010) and Federal Election 
Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life (2007), the Supreme Court dramatically reduced the 
ability of Congress to regulate campaign finance activities of corporations and others active in 
elections.  Many of the same activities are still subject to restrictions imposed by the Internal 
Revenue Code, and the tax code’s restrictions are considerably more intrusive than what is 
permitted under campaign finance law.  For example, section 501(c)(3) charitable organizations 
are not permitted to engage in any campaign activity, and the definition of campaign activity for 
tax code purposes is much broader than it is for campaign finance law purposes.  Many nonprofit 
organizations involved in election-related activities are thus subject to two different and sometimes 
conflicting legal standards regulating their election-related activities. 
This Article analyzes recent campaign finance decisions that have enlarged the area of 
protected political speech to determine how, if at all, the Roberts Court’s campaign finance 
jurisprudence is likely to alter existing tax law jurisprudence in the area of election activity.  For 
the most part, tax law jurisprudence has developed independently of other areas of First 
Amendment law.  Based upon an analysis of the distinctive tax law constitutional doctrines, the 
Article concludes that the tax law prohibition against section 501(c)(3) charities engaging in 
campaigns is likely to withstand constitutional challenges seeking to import the campaign finance 
First Amendment standard to invalidate the tax law restrictions.  The Article also concludes that 
an overbreadth challenge is likely to fail.  There is some possibility that the tax law prohibition is 
vulnerable to constitutional attack under traditional doctrines of vagueness because the terms of 
the tax law provisions, as these have been elaborated to date, are not sufficiently precise.  However, 
what will transpire in the coming years is more likely to be a function of the degree of activism of 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since John G. Roberts became Chief Justice, the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly been accused of judicial activism.1  Among other rea-
 
 1 See Press Release, U.S. Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, Senate Judiciary Meeting on the 
Nomination of Solicitor General Elena Kagan to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court (Jul. 20, 2010), available at http://whitehouse.senate.gov/newsroom/press/
release/?id=20C66640-20C3-4B3E-8959-AA302211486F (arguing that the Roberts Court’s 
numerous 5-4 decisions are evidence of judicial activism because they reflect the Court’s 
unwillingness to narrow its holdings to achieve broader consensus);  see also Erwin Che-
merinsky, Conservatives Embrace Judicial Activism in Campaign Finance Ruling, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 22, 2010, at A29 (arguing that conservative jutices on the Roberts Court “are happy 
to be activists when it serves their ideological agenda”); Simon Lazarus, The Most Activist 
Court:  How progressives should think about and respond to the assaults of the Roberts Court, AMER. 
PROSPECT (June 29, 2007), http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_most_
activist_court (characterizing the Roberts Court as an “activist enterprise”); Dan Rad-
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sons, the Roberts Court has expressly overturned earlier decisions in 
numerous areas of the law,2 and it has arguably overturned earlier 
decisions in numerous other cases.3 
 
macher, Judicial Activism for Me, Not for Thee, ROANOKE TIMES, Mar. 28, 2010, at 1 (“The 
Roberts Court, despite the chief justice’s [sic] promises to respect precedent, has not 
shied away from the type of judicial activism conservatives normally decry.”); Jeffrey Ro-
sen, Court Approval, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 23, 2007, at 9, 12 (“For more than 50 years, 
conservatives have insisted that judges should defer to legislatures and let citizens resolve 
their disputes politically.  But, at the very moment they consolidated their majority, they 
have abandoned this principle and embraced the activism they once deplored.”); Jeffrey 
Toobin, Activism v. Restraint, THE NEW YORKER, May 24, 2010, at 19 (“Chief Justice John G. 
Roberts, Jr., and his conservative fellow-Justices, like their ideological kinsmen in the ni-
neteen-thirties, are engaging in what’s known as judicial activism.”).  There is no authori-
tative definition of the term “judicial activism,” and even those who have defined it would 
probably admit that much judicial activism is in the eye of the beholder.  As a general 
rule of thumb, a court that frequently (by some standard) strikes down legislation or 
overturns judicial precedent is likely to be considered activist, especially if it is seen as mo-
tivated by its own policy preferences rather than a careful consideration of established 
doctrines.  See Frank B. Cross & Stefanie A. Lindquist, The Scientific Study of Judicial Activ-
ism, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1752, 1754 (2007) (discussing a “social scientific measure of judicial 
activism that allows comparisons across courts and across Justices”); Frank H. Easter-
brook, Do Liberals and Conservatives Differ in Judicial Activism?, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1401, 
1403–04 (2002) (arguing that the definition of what constitutes “activism” should reflect 
the view that “unless the application of the Constitution or statute is so clear that it has 
the traditional qualities of law rather than political or moral philosophy, a judge should 
let democracy prevail”) (emphasis in original); Eric J. Segall, Reconceptualizing Judicial Ac-
tivism as Judicial Responsibility:  A Tale of Two Justice Kennedys, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 709, 711–712 
(2009) (“Instead of the current and relentless discussion of judicial activism . . . we should 
focus more on . . . judicial responsibility.  The Court ought to write its decisions consis-
tently with professional standards, adhere to basic rule of law principles, and, perhaps, 
engage in principled decision making while reaching results the public can at least tole-
rate.”); Keenan D. Kmiec, Comment, The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial Activ-
ism,”, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1443–44 (2004) (exploring the history of the concept of judi-
cial activism and identifying five modern meanings of judicial activism). 
 2 See e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (overturning two Supreme 
Court precedents and a federal statute enacted in 1947); Pearson v. Callahan,  129 S. Ct. 
808, 813 (2009) (overturning the mandatory two-step process for courts to judge police 
officers’ qualified immunity first established in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)); 
Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2091 (2009) (overturning Michigan v. Jackson, 475 
U.S. 625 (1986)); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 
(2007) (overruling Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), 
which held that minimum retail price agreements were per se illegal); Bowles v. Russell, 
551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007) (overruling Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, 
Inc., 371 U.S. 215 (1962) and Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S. 384 (1964) (per curiam) “to the 
extent they purport to authorize an exception to a jurisdictional rule”). 
 3 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1476–77 (2009) (overruling, according to the 
dissent written by Justice Souter, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974)); Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 576–77 (2007) (overruling, according to the dissent 
written by Justice Stevens, the literal reading of the sufficiency standard stated in Conley v. 
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957)); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 
1, 551 U.S. 701, 823–37 (2007) (overruling, according to the dissent written by Justice 
Breyer, established precedents that distinguish the application of strict scrutiny in racial 
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Whether the Roberts Court’s decisions are actually more activist 
than those of earlier Supreme Courts is a topic that warrants serious 
debate.4  In the area of political speech, however, the record is clear 
that the Court does not feel bound to defer to Congressional judg-
ments and judicial precedents. Citizens United v. Federal Election Com-
 
discrimination challenges involving exclusive as against inclusive race-conscious policies); 
FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL), 551 U.S. 449, 483–84, 504 (2007) (overruling, ac-
cording to seven of the Justices, one of the core holdings of McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 
(2003)); see also infra note 135 and accompanying text.  Several commentators have also 
argued that the Roberts Court has tacitly or stealthily overruled precedents.  See, e.g., Civil 
Rights Under Fire:  Recent Supreme Court Decisions:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitu-
tion, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 83 (2009) 
(testimony of Dahlia Lithwick, Senior Editor, Slate Magazine) (“I think it is no longer a 
matter of any real scholarly dispute that the current U.S. Supreme Court has worked hard 
in some ways to roll back what some conservatives have seen as the worst excesses of the 
Warren court era . . . . But I want to point out that more frequently it happens very un-
dramatically in a series of feints and legal pirouettes . . . .”); Barry Friedman, The Wages of 
Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 4 (2010) 
(discussing why the Court “would choose to overrule by stealth, rather than overtly, [and] 
the effects of [it] choosing to do so”); Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence:  The Roberts 
Court’s Deregulatory Turn in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1064, 1065 
(2008) (arguing that “Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have made . . . deregulatory 
moves without expressly overturning existing precedent”); ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, THE 
ROBERTS COURT’S RECORD OF OVERREACHING, 2–3 (2010), http://www.afj.org/connect-
with-the-issues/the-corporate-court/roberts-court-overreach-memo.pdf (last visited Mar. 
27, 2011) (arguing that the Roberts Court has overstepped its boundaries by “deciding to 
hear cases about legal issues which do not currently warrant Supreme Court review,” 
“answering questions not presented to the Court,” and “deciding factual issues more 
properly reviewed and decided by lower courts”); see also Laura Krugman Ray, The Style of 
a Skeptic:  The Opinions of Chief Justice Roberts, 83 IND. L.J. 997, 1033 (2008) (noting U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions that “tend[] to undermine, though not expressly overrule, 
Court precedents”); Nina Totenberg, The Roberts Court and the Role of Precedent, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (July 3, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=1168820 
(“Although [Justices] Roberts and Alito both promised at their confirmation hearings to 
honor precedent whenever possible, in their first full term together, they effectively re-
versed a number of key precedents.”). 
 4 It is possible, however, that the Court has acquired this reputation because of the contrast 
between the Chief Justice’s claim, during his nomination hearings, that he would judge as 
an umpire calling balls and strikes, not as a legislator, and the perception of some that he 
has been especially aggressive in his rulings.  See Editorial, The Court’s Aggressive Term, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jul. 5, 2010, at A16 (“In the most recent term, even more than in earlier years, the 
Roberts court [sic] demonstrated its determination to act aggressively to undo aspects of 
law it found wanting, no matter the cost.”); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John 
G. Roberts to be Chief Justice of the United States:  Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 109th Cong. 56 (Sept. 13, 2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, nominee for Chief 
Justice of the Unites states Supreme Court), available at http://frwebgate.access.
gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_senate_hearings&docid=f:23539.wais (last visi-
ted Mar. 27, 2011).  But see Erwin Chemerinsky, An Overview of the October 2006 Supreme 
Court Term, 23 TOURO L. REV. 731, 734–738 (2008) (arguing that the Court was conserva-
tive in the 2006–07 term). 
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mission5 is Exhibit A for this proposition, although the Roberts 
Court’s non-deferential approach can be seen in earlier political 
speech cases such as Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to 
Life, Inc.6 and Davis v. Federal Election Commission.7  Certainly Citizens 
United is the most dramatic8 instance of judicial activism by the Ro-
berts Court involving political speech because the majority overruled 
two earlier Supreme Court decisions, invalidated a federal law of 
long-standing, and, by implication, invalidated parallel state cam-
paign finance provisions in at least 24 states.9 
In addition to their immediate and direct effect on the content of 
federal campaign finance regulation, these decisions strengthening 
First Amendment protection for political speech have called into 
question the validity of the Internal Revenue Code’s regulation of po-
litical campaign activity.  In particular, the campaign activities of 
nonprofit organizations10 are subject to federal tax law (the “Code”)11 
as well as federal campaign finance regulation (the Federal Election 
Campaign Act or “FECA”).12   The provisions of these two statutory 
 
 5 See supra note 2.  This theme is the focus of Justice Stevens’ dissent in Citizens United.  130 
S. Ct. at 929 et seq. 
 6 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
 7 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2775 (2008) (invalidating the millionaire’s provision); see also McComish 
v. Bennett, 130 S. Ct. 3408 (2010) (granting a stay preventing enforcement of part of Ari-
zona’s decade-old public financing law). 
 8 See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 
581 (2011) (calling the Citizen’s United decision a “blockbuster”); John McArdle, Politics, 
Roll Call, March 4, 2010, at 9 (describing the opinion as having sent “shock waves 
through the political world”); Editorial, supra note 4 (asserting the “Roberts court[‘s]. . . 
determination to act aggressively to undo aspects of law it found wanting, no matter the 
cost”). 
 9 The judicial precedents are McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) and Austin v. Mich. State 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).  The federal statute invalidated in Citizens Unit-
ed was originally enacted as 18 U.S.C. § 610.  See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 619, 62 
Stat. 723 (1948) (banning political contributions by national banks, corporations, or la-
bor organizations).  For the impact of Citizens United on state campaign finance laws, see 
CU + The States, STATEOFELECTIONS.COM, http://electls.blogs.wm.edu/citizens-united-
and-the-states (last updated Feb. 2, 2011). 
 10 In the Internal Revenue Code, nonprofits are referred to as “exempt organizations.”  See 
I.R.C. § 501(c) (2006).  The two terms are not interchangeable, however.  Nonprofit sta-
tus is conferred under state law, and not all state law nonprofits qualify as exempt organi-
zations under federal tax law.  Nonetheless, for the sake of brevity, this Article sometimes 
uses the term “nonprofit” to mean “exempt organization.” 
 11 All references to the Code are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended (the 
“Code”).  Throughout this article, references to “tax law” refer to the federal income tax 
provisions in the Code and the associated regulations and administrative authorities, un-
less otherwise noted. 
 12 2 U.S.C. § 431 et. seq. (2000) (“FECA”). 
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regimes13 are very different, so that a specific campaign-related activi-
ty engaged in by a nonprofit may be subject to campaign finance re-
strictions under FECA, but not subject to tax law restrictions under 
the Code, or the reverse.  Alternatively, both statutes may regulate the 
scope or manner of a specific kind of campaign related activity, but to 
different degrees or in different ways.  Ultimately these differences 
can be traced to the fact that the two statutory regimes have been 
enacted to further different public purposes.  That the two regimes 
are administered and enforced by different agencies, with differing 
missions, powers, and histories, creates additional layers of complexi-
ty.14 
The Code’s restrictions on campaign activity, which apply primari-
ly to exempt organizations,15 extend to a wider range of election re-
lated activities than is considered constitutional under federal elec-
tion law.  As a result, these restrictions are usually regarded by the 
regulated organizations as more intrusive than FECA restrictions.16  It 
is not surprising, then, that in 2009, lawsuits were filed challenging, 
inter alia, the constitutionality of the tax law restrictions as they apply 
to a 501(c)(3) organization and a 501(c)(4) group.17  The plaintiffs in 
 
 13 In this Article, the phrase “statutory regime” includes the rules created by the statute 
combined with the implementing regulations and administrative decisions and pro-
nouncements, as these have been interpreted by the relevant agencies and the courts. 
 14 See Lloyd H. Mayer, The Much Maligned 527 and Institutional Choice, 87 B.U. L. REV. 625, 
627 (2007) (arguing that “Congress’ current approach to regulating 527s will almost cer-
tainly result in a confusing and ineffective legal regime,” discussing a “framework for eva-
luating which of two bodies of law is best suited to regulate a particular set of activities,” 
and proposing “specific changes to how Congress has and continues to approach the 
regulation of political activity and 527s”); see also Elizabeth Kingsley & John Pomeranz, A 
Crash at the Crossroads:  Tax and Campaign Finance Laws Collide in Regulation of Political Activ-
ities of Tax-Exempt Organizations, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 55, 58–59 (2004) (responding 
to efforts by campaign finance reformers to import tax law standards into campaign 
finance law by arguing that the different purposes of the two regimes would make such 
endeavors unwise). 
 15 See infra Part I.A.  The definition of campaign activity is also important for sections 
162(e), 271, 276, and 527 of the Code. 
 16 See infra Part I. 
 17 See Complaint, Christian Coal. of Fla., Inc. v. United States, No. 5:09-cv-144-Oc-10GRJ, 
2010 WL 3061800 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2010) [hereinafter Complaint, Christian Coal.] (dis-
missing the challenge to restrictions as applied to a 501(c)(4) group); Complaint, Catho-
lic Answers, Inc. v. United States, No. 09-cv-670-IEG (AJB), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96070 
(S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2009) (dismissing the challenge to restrictions as applied to a 
501(c)(3) group) [hereinafter Complaint, Catholic Answers].  Both complaints assert that 
the tax provisions are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.  Both also rely upon Big 
Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1980), which holds that the 
definition of “educational” in an IRS regulation lacked sufficient specificity to be consti-
tutional.  For the trial court decisions, see Christian Coal., 2010 WL 3061800; Catholic An-
swers, 2009 WL 3320498. 
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these cases relied, in part, on the First Amendment standard an-
nounced in the campaign finance context in Wisconsin Right to Life.18  
To date, the constitutionality of the tax restrictions on political activi-
ty has been adjudicated only once.  In Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, a 
decision involving a church that placed political ads in two national 
newspapers on the eve of the 1992 presidential election, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld 
the tax law political prohibition for 501(c)(3) organizations in the 
face of both free speech and free exercise challenges.19 
It is thus likely that in the next few years, the Supreme Court will 
be asked to address the constitutionality of the tax law restrictions on 
campaign activity.  This Article examines whether the constitutional 
law doctrine developed in response to campaign finance restrictions 
on political speech should be applied to the parallel restrictions on 
the same type of speech imposed by tax law.  The Article focuses on 
the prohibition preventing section 501(c)(3) organizations from un-
dertaking political campaign activity, although much of the analysis 
would also apply to the less restrictive limitations on the campaign ac-
tivities of other groups described in section 501(c). 
Parts I–III discuss three critical areas in which the campaign 
finance regime and the federal tax regime can produce inconsistent 
results for nonprofits active during political campaigns:  (1) the cate-
gories of election related activity that may be restricted, (2) the prop-
er method for agencies to use to determine if a group’s activities have 
violated their restrictions, and (3) the level of scrutiny a court will 
employ to determine if a restriction violates constitutional norms.  
These three areas were central to the reasoning in Wisconsin Right to 
Life and Citizens United, and they will undoubtedly provide the frame-
work for determining the constitutionality of the restrictions on polit-
ical campaign activity contained in tax law. 
Part IV.A analyzes how the traditional tax constitutional doctrines 
discussed in Parts I–III are likely to be applied to the political prohi-
bition preventing 501(c)(3) organizations from participating in polit-
ical campaigns.  I conclude that it would be inappropriate to import 
 
 18 See Complaint, Christian Coal., supra note 17, at ¶ 64; Complaint, Catholic Answers, supra 
note 17, at ¶ 31. 
 19 Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 139 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (affirming the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment to the IRS).  See infra notes 154 and 168 and accom-
panying text.  For the free exercise claim, see Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 142–43; for the 
free speech claim, see id. at 143–44.  See also Branch Ministries, Inc. v. Rossotti, 40 F. 
Supp. 2d 15, 26–27 (D.D.C. 1999) (the trial court decision).  The Supreme Court upheld 
tax law restrictions on lobbying by charities in Regan v. Taxation with Representation of 
Washington (TWR), 461 U.S. 540, 550–51 (1983). 
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the campaign finance First Amendment standards developed by Citi-
zens United and Wisconsin Right to Life into tax law First Amendment 
jurisprudence because the constitutional principles underlying the 
two spheres of constitutional law are fundamentally different, permit-
ting more intrusive regulation by the tax code than by FECA. 
Part IV.B then analyzes the political prohibition in light of the “ra-
tional relation” test endorsed by tax law jurisprudence in comparable 
situations and concludes that the prohibition’s purpose and the 
means chosen to achieve that purpose are likely to pass constitutional 
muster.  The rational relation test is appropriate because existing tax 
law precedents make clear that the impact of the political prohibition 
on exempt organizations will not be deemed a burden as a matter of 
constitutional law.  This is the case even if the organizations in ques-
tion will suffer economically from a loss of revenues if they forgo tax 
exemption in order to be involved in political campaigns.  Thus, the 
political prohibition should survive challenge unless the Supreme 
Court uses the occasion to consider overruling the established tax law 
precedents.  Such a possibility is real because of the Roberts Court’s 
“deregulatory” turn in the area of campaign finance.20 
Part IV.C examines the possibility that the political prohibition 
may be deemed unconstitutional because of overbreadth or vague-
ness.  I conclude that the overbreadth claim will not succeed because 
it presupposes the very doctrine that it seeks to prove.  The vagueness 
claim is stronger because of the relative lack of precision in the terms 
of the prohibition and the authorities elaborating its meaning.  This 
Part concludes that the Supreme Court might examine this question 
using a form of heightened scrutiny and that, in such an event, the 
outcome is less certain than the outcome of the previous inquiries.  
Thus, although it seems that the balance of authorities favors uphold-
ing the political prohibition in the tax code despite the dramatic 
changes made by the recent campaign finance cases, some ambiguity 
remains as to its constitutionality using existing tax doctrines.  In the 
event that the prohibition is invalidated on vagueness grounds, the 
Internal Revenue Service will have to elaborate the terms of the pro-
hibition in greater detail in precedential guidance before the existing 
regulatory regime could be reinstated. 
 
 20 See Hasen, supra note 8, at 585 (“[T]he Court’s jurisprudence, while certainly shifting to-
ward a deregulatory direction, may not move to complete deregulation unless the Court 
is willing to endure continued public backlash.”). 
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I.  THE COMPETING REGIMES:  CATEGORIES OR ELECTION RELATED 
ACTIVITY SUBJECT TO GOVERNMENT REGULATION 
A. The Expansive Tax Law Approach 
Since 1954, the Internal Revenue Code has prohibited charities21 
from participating or intervening in political campaigns.22  According 
to the statute, publishing and distributing statements count as inter-
vention, and activity taken in opposition to a candidate counts to the 
same degree as activity in support of a candidate.23  The implement-
ing Treasury regulations add that the prohibition applies to indirect 
as well as direct political participation.24  The political prohibition was 
added to the description of charitable entities in 1954 as a result of a 
floor amendment proposed by then Senator Lyndon Johnson.  Al-
though the legislative history of the 1954 enactment is silent as to the 
immediate reason for enacting the provision,25 political activities of 
 
 21 “Charities” is shorthand for organizations described in section 501(c)(3) of the Code and 
exempt from federal income tax because of their educational, religious, scientific, and 
other activities specified in the Code. 
 22 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). 
 23 Id.  Until 1987, the statute did not contain the phrase “or in opposition to.”  See Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100–203, 101 Stat. 1330–464, § 10711 (1987).  
However, campaign activity was always understood to include both support and opposi-
tion to a candidate for public office. 
 24 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(3)(ii), (c)(3)(iii) (1987). 
 25 See H.R. 7835, 73d Cong. §§ 101(6), 406 (1934).  Only the lobbying limitation was 
enacted into law in 1934.  ROBERT B. BURDETTE, MARIE B. MORRIS & THOMAS B. RIPY, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 87–298 A, TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS:  LOBBYING AND 
POLITICAL ACTIVITY 3 (1987).  A provision limiting charities’ participation  in “partisan 
politics” was approved by the Senate in 1934 at the same time as the provision limiting the 
lobbying permissible for charities was enacted, but the political participation provision 
was not enacted into law, and it is unclear why it was dropped.  Both provisions may have 
been inspired by an earlier court decision stating that “political agitation” should not be 
paid for by “public subvention.”  Slee v. Comm’r, 42 F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1930).  For 
theories regarding the origin of Johnson’s amendment, see generally Deirdre D. Hallo-
ran & Kevin M. Kearney, Federal Tax Code Restrictions on Church Political Activity, 38 CATH. 
LAW. 105, 106–08 (1998); Oliver A. Houck, On the Limits of Charity:  Lobbying, Litigation, 
and Electoral Politics by Charitable Organizations under the Internal Revenue Code and Related 
Laws, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 23–29 (2003); Chris Kemmitt, RFRA, Churches and the IRS:  Re-
considering the Legal Boundaries of Church Activity in the Political Sphere, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
145, 152–53 (2006); Patrick L. O’Daniel, More Honored in the Breach:  A Historical Perspective 
of the Permeable IRS Prohibition on Campaigning by Churches, 42 B.C.L. Rev. 733, 746–67 
(2001); infra note 26. 
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charities had been the subject of Congressional hearings and propos-
als several times in the previous decades.26 
In contrast to charities, organizations described in other subsec-
tions of section 501(c) are permitted to participate or intervene in 
political campaigns.  These include social welfare and civic organiza-
tions described in section 501(c)(4), labor organizations described in 
section 501(c)(5), and trade associations and chambers of commerce 
described in section 501(c)(6).27  Such organizations, however, must 
be primarily engaged in promoting the mission that is the basis of 
their respective exemptions.  Campaign activities are not considered 
to promote an exempt purpose for any subsection of section 501(c).28  
Thus, 501(c) organizations other than charities are permitted to en-
gage in campaign activities, but if these become extensive enough, 
they can undermine an organization’s claim to be devoted primarily 
to its exempt purpose.  Moreover, private benefit and certain com-
mercial transactions, if any exist, must be aggregated with the group’s 
campaign intervention to determine if the group is organized and 
operating primarily for its exempt purpose.29  In addition to these li-
 
 26 See Ann M. Murphy, Campaign Signs and the Collection Plate—Never the Twain Shall Meet?, 1 
PITT. TAX REV. 35, 45–53 (2003) (discussing the impetus behind the enactment of the 
provision prohibiting tax-exempt organizations from engaging in political activities and 
the enactment of the House Select Committee which was meant to ascertain whether 
these organizations were influenced by Communists and were not engaged in politics); 
Roger C. Colinvaux, Citizens United and the Political Speech of Charities 5–10 (Dec. 17, 
2010) (unpublished draft), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1726407. 
 27 IRS, Fact Sheet 97–8:  Political Activity of Exempt Organizations, I.R.S. (Feb. 1997), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/fs-97-8.txt [hereinafter IRS, Fact Sheet]. 
 28 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)–1(a)(2)(ii) (“The promotion of social welfare does not in-
clude direct or indirect participation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of 
or in opposition to any candidate for public office.”); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,286, 
1975 GCM Lexis 391 (May 22, 1975) (“[T]he exemption of a labor organization . . . will 
not be affected by its participation in political activities of the nature described in its 
submission provided that its primary purposes and activities still entitle it to such exemp-
tion.”); IRS, Fact Sheet 97–8, supra note 27 (“Charities exempt from tax . . . and eligible to 
receive tax deductible charitable contributions may devote no more than an insubstantial 
amount of their overall activities attempting to influence legislation . . . .”).  In contrast, 
campaign activities are the core of the exempt purpose of section 527 groups.  See I.R.C. § 
527(e) (2006) (defining a political organization that is “operated primarily for the pur-
pose of directly or indirectly accepting contributions or making expenditures, or both, 
for an exempt function.”). 
 29 The “primarily” standard is undefined and controversial.  When litigating against social 
welfare organizations, the IRS has repeatedly argued that the “primarily” standard means 
that a group’s non-social welfare activities cannot be “substantial.”  See Vision Servs. Plan 
v. United States, 2006–1 T.C. ¶ 50,173, aff’d 2008–1 T.C. ¶50,160, cert. denied 129 S. Ct. 
898 (2009); Brief for the United States in Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of Certi-
orari at 8, Vision Serv. Plan, Inc. v. United States,2008–1 T.C. ¶50,160 (2008) (No. 08–
164) (arguing that “a single nonexempt purpose, if substantial in nature, renders an or-
ganization ineligible for tax-exempt status”).  At least one official of the IRS has stated 
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mitations, such organizations may also be subject to a tax calculated 
using the dollar amount of their campaign expenditures as a base.30 
Thus, all 501(c) exempt organizations are subject to restrictions 
on their campaign activity.  Because the Code and the implementing 
Treasury regulations do not elaborate which election-related activities 
qualify as participating or intervening in political campaigns, the 
meaning of these terms must be derived from various Revenue Rul-
ings, numerous other administrative pronouncements, and a few 
court cases.31  These authorities elaborate an expansive view of the 
types of election related activities that are subject to the tax law re-
strictions.  In addition to the obvious culprits, such as communicating 
or funding a message that expressly endorses a specific candidate or 
 
that a social welfare organization may be entitled to exemption even if 49% of its activities 
are not devoted to social welfare.  See Judy Kindell on § 501(c)(4)–(6) Organizations and 
§ 527, 11 PAUL STRECKFUS’ EO TAX J. 42, 45 (2006) (stating that as long as more than 
50% of an organization’s activity is in furtherance of their exempt purpose, an organiza-
tion is entitled to exemption); see also Roundtable Discussion with Miriam Galston, Marc 
Owens and Celia Roady, 9 PAUL STRECKFUS’S EO TAX J. 19, 24 ( 2004) (discussing what 
“primary” means in the 501(c)(4) context).  Whatever the standard, the IRS can measure 
more than a group’s expenditures for election activities to determine if the standard is sa-
tisfied, as it does with the lobbying standard, where the importance of lobbying for a 
group’s mission matters as well as the cost of its lobbying.  See Haswell v. United States, 
500 F.2d 1133, 1147 (Ct. Cl. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975) (“Distribution of ex-
penditures is only one measure of the substantiality of NARP’s political activities.”); Na-
tionalist Movement v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 558, 589 (1994), aff’d on other grounds in 37 F.3d 
216 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1192 (1995) (“Whether an activity is substantial 
is a facts-and-circumstances inquiry not always dependent upon time or expenditure per-
centages.”). 
 30 See I.R.C. § 527(f)(1) (2006).  Section 527(f)(1) provides that the tax will be assessed on 
the lesser of the amount of a group’s campaign expenditures or its net investment in-
come.  Groups with little net investment income will thus have relatively little tax expo-
sure no matter how much they spend on campaign activities. 
 31 For examples of the Revenue Rulings, see Rev. Rul. 2007–41, 2007–1 C.B.. 1421; Rev. Rul. 
2006–4, 2006–1 C.B. 264; Rev. Rul. 86–95, 1986–2 C.B. 73; Rev. Rul. 80–282, 1980–2 C.B. 
178; Rev. Rul. 78–248, 1978–1 C.B. 154; Rev. Rul. 76–456, 1976–2 C.B. 151; Rev. Rul. 74–
574, 1974–2 C.B.. 161; Rev. Rul. 72-512, 1972-2 C.B. 246; Rev. Rul. 72–513, 1972–2 C.B. 
246; Rev. Rul. 67–71, 1967–1 C.B. 125; Rev. Rul. 66–256, 1966–2 C.B. 210.  Judicial deci-
sions include Branch Ministries, Inc. v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Ass’n of 
the Bar of New York v. Comm’r, 858 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1030 
(1989); Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989); 
Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. 
denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973); United States v. Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096 (7th Cir. 1981).  See 
also Democratic Leadership Council, Inc. v. United States, 542 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 
2008); Am. Campaign Acad.v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989).  Important non-
precedential guidance includes: Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,811 (June 30, 1989); I.R.S. Tech. 
Adv. Mem. 91–30–008 (Apr. 16, 1991); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91–17–001 (Sept. 5, 1990); 
see also IRS, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL 
INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FY 2003, at 335 (2002).  Several of the preceding sources are 
discussed infra Part II.A. 
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contributing money to a candidate’s campaign, the Service also classi-
fies as campaign intervention all activities that support or oppose a 
candidate for office or otherwise intervene in an election, indirectly 
as well as directly.  For example, for IRS purposes, running a pre-
election television ad that disparages a candidate’s character and de-
nies her fitness for elected public office will be considered campaign 
intervention.  Less obviously, the New York City Bar Association’s 
nonpartisan rating of candidates running for election as judge disqu-
alified it from receiving exempt status as a 501(c)(3) organization.32  
Despite the fact that it often gave multiple competing candidates the 
same highest rating and political party played no role in its evalua-
tions, the Service determined that the Bar Association’s act of rating 
candidates for elective office constituted intervention in a political 
campaign.33 
The IRS may find a candidate debate that includes all the candi-
dates for a particular office34 nonpartisan and thus not subject to 
these restrictions.  The debate may, however, be classified as cam-
paign activity if the content of the questions, the format of the de-
bate, or anything else appears to favor or disfavor one candidate in 
comparison to the others.35  Similarly, a 501(c)(3) organization may 
invite candidates to speak at group functions, but only if it invites 
competing candidates to functions of comparable importance to the 
host group.36  This limitation does not apply, however, if a candidate 
 
 32 See Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York v. Comm’r, 858 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1988), 
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1030 (1989) (“In pursuing this activity, the Association falls clearly 
within the definition of an ‘action’ organization, i.e., one that ‘participates or intervenes, 
directly or indirectly, in any political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any candi-
date for public office.” (internal citation omitted) (emphases in original)). 
 33 See id. at 880–82. 
 34 It is unnecessary to include all candidates in all instances, however.  See Judith E. Kindell 
& John F. Reilly, Election Year Issues, in IRS, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING 
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FY 2002, at 335, 374 
(2001) [hereinafter 2002 CPE], available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/
ebook/part3/documents/electionyearissues.pdf (“Many times, the number of legally 
qualified candidates for a particular office is so large that an IRC 501(c)(3) organization 
may determine that holding a debate to which all legally qualified candidates were invited 
would be impractical and would not further the educational purposes of the organiza-
tion.”). 
 35 Rev. Rul. 86–95, 1986–2 C.B. 73; see also Rev. Rul. 66–256, 1966–2 C.B. 210.  Rev. Rul. 86-
95 explicitly mentions facts and circumstances suggesting a neutral manner or showing “a 
bias or a preference with respect to the views of a particular candidate.”  Rev. Rul. 2007–
41, 2007–1 C.B. 1421, 1423. 
 36 See 2002 CPE, supra note 34, at 381 (“An IRC 501(c)(3) organization that invites one can-
didate to speak at its main banquet of the year and invites an opposing candidate to speak 
at a sparsely attended general meeting will likely be found to have violated the political 
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is invited to a group’s function in a capacity other than as a candi-
date, e.g., as a spokesperson for a particular issue of interest to the 
group’s members.37  For example, an environmental group could 
have invited Al Gore to speak to its members in the weeks before the 
2000 presidential election, even though he was a candidate for Presi-
dent, as long as no mention was made of the election, no money was 
raised for Gore’s campaign, and there were no endorsements of his 
candidacy.  Questionnaires sent to candidates and disseminated to 
voters or the publication of voting records may be nonpartisan or 
they may evidence bias and constitute prohibited campaign activity.  
Bias, according to the Service, can be inferred by the narrowness of 
the subjects covered, the timing of the distribution, or the extent of 
the distribution as well as by editorial content.38 
In short, under the tax law, diverse activities and communica-
tions—none of which is an express endorsement of one or more can-
didates for public office—may constitute political intervention of the 
kind prohibited to 501(c)(3) organizations and subject to restrictions 
in the case of groups exempt under other subsections of 501(c). 
B.  The Minimalist Campaign Finance Law Approach 
Traditionally, the three main types of federal campaign finance 
regulation were disclosure rules (primarily registration and reporting 
rules); limitations on the amount that individuals and entities can 
contribute in a year or election cycle to candidates and parties or to 
their committees (the “amount” rules); and prohibitions on corpora-
tions and unions spending money from their general funds for cer-
tain types of election related speech (the “source” rules).  In 2010, in 
Citizens United, the Supreme Court invalidated the source rules for 
expenditures made by corporations (and, by implication, for unions) 
 
campaign prohibition, even if the manner of presentation for both speakers is otherwise 
neutral.”). 
 37 See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421, 1423-24 (listing as a criterion, for example, 
“whether the individual speaks only in a non-candidate capacity”); 2002 CPE, supra note 
34, at 381–82 (“Candidates may also be invited to speak at events by IRC 501(c)(3) organ-
izations in their capacity other than as a candidate.”). 
38  See Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154 (analyzing factors such as the narrowness of issues 
covered in the organization’s publication, how widely distributed it was, and whether it 
was distributed during a political campaign); Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178, 179 (hold-
ing that the publication of a newsletter that contained the voting records of Congression-
al incumbents did not constitute participation in a political campaign because it was not 
widely distributed and involved only a small distribution in a particular congressional dis-
trict).  For other factors affecting whether election related activities will be characterized 
as political intervention, see infra Part II.A. 
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as long as they act independently of candidates, parties, and their 
committees.39  However, the Court upheld the disclosure rules appli-
cable to independent corporate expenditures, and it did not address 
the validity of the rules preventing corporations and unions from 
making political contributions.40 
The categories of campaign activity subject to regulation by FECA 
are for the most part precisely and narrowly defined, a fact usually 
explained in terms of First Amendment considerations.  Specifically, 
the Supreme Court takes the view that campaign-related speech is 
core political speech that is protected by the First Amendment of the 
Constitution and essential to the successful working of democratic 
processes.41  When such speech is burdened by regulation, the gov-
ernment must justify its action by demonstrating a sufficiently strong 
state interest and persuading the Court that the restrictions imposed 
are designed to accomplish that interest in a fashion no broader than 
the applicable constitutional standard permits.42 
As elaborated by the courts, the First Amendment protection of 
political speech permits campaign finance regulations designed to 
prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption in elections, but 
not to equalize the resources available to different participants in the 
political process.43  Although burdensome to some degree, campaign 
contributions may be regulated by FECA because they involve trans-
fers made directly to candidates or parties.  Thus, they are most likely 
to leave the recipients feeling indebted to donors and to create occa-
 
 39 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).  However, if corporations or unions 
coordinate their actions with candidates or campaigns, the expenditures will be treated as 
campaign contributions and subject to the rules for contributions. 
 40 The Court applied two distinct levels of heightened scrutiny, depending upon the type of 
campaign activity involved and the degree to which the speaker’s speech is burdened.  See 
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915–17.  These are discussed infra Part III. 
 41 See Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. at 2773–74 (endorsing this view and citing earlier decisions 
and dissents to the same effect). 
 42 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25–28 (1976) (per curiam) (requiring that the state “em-
ploy[] means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational free-
doms”); United States v. Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 577–78 (1957) (quoting a Senator 
stating that large contributions make political parties feel obligated to the donors).  In 
this section of the article, I associate gratitude, influence, and access with corruption.  
This is the approach taken by the Supreme Court until recently.  In Citizens United, how-
ever, the majority claimed that only quid pro quo corruption constitutes corruption for 
campaign finance law purposes.  The Court’s claim, however, does not comport with the 
precedents.  See the discussion infra notes 127–138 and accompanying text. 
 43 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48 (stating that “[a]dvocacy of the election or defeat of candidates for 
federal office is no less entitled to protection under the First Amendment than the dis-
cussion of political policy . . . .”). 
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sions for corruption.44  In contrast, funds spent by people or organiza-
tions independent of a campaign are subject to the least amount of 
regulation.  According to the Supreme Court in Buckley, the reason is 
that, if the individual or group paying for a political communication 
during a campaign acts independently of a candidate or political par-
ty, the risk of corruption is less likely than the risk is with campaign 
contributions; in the former case, the candidate and party will not 
control the timing or content of the communication and might even 
find it unhelpful.45  The assumption seems to be that a candidate’s 
lack of control of the activity reduces the likelihood of the candidate 
feeling gratitude toward the one who makes the expenditure, even if 
the result is helpful to the campaign. 
The threat of corruption is nonetheless seen as real when inde-
pendent expenditures46 are made to endorse a specific candidate, de-
 
 44 See FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982) (discussing how “large 
financial contributions” create “political debts” and pose the risk of corruption).  Regula-
tion of campaign contributions is also permitted, according to the Supreme Court, be-
cause such regulation is only minimally burdensome.  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20–21.  In 
2006, however, the Court found certain contribution limits so low that they constituted a 
violation of the First Amendment.  See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248–59 (2006). 
 45 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47 (explaining that “independent expenditures may well provide little 
assistance to the candidate’s campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive.”).  
There seems to be a disconnect between the theory and reality:  when donors give mil-
lions of dollars to (non-registered) 527 groups, which are not subject to FECA source and 
amount rules, the candidates benefited are likely to notice and can be expected to feel 
indebted whenever (as is often the case) the 527 groups are known to support specific 
candidates and parties.  In addition, 527 group staff may be “independent” of campaigns 
and candidates as a matter of law without being so in fact.  See infra notes 47. 
 46 Although FECA does not define persons or entities who are independent, it does define 
“independent expenditures” as funds used for express advocacy of a candidate for federal 
office if they are “not made in concert or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion 
of such candidate, the candidate’s authorized political committee or their agents, or a po-
litical party committee or its agents.”  2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (2006).  See 11 C.F.R § 109.21(d) 
(2011) (listing types of conduct that constitute “coordinated communication”).  The 
courts have invalidated FEC regulations that define “coordination” too narrowly, and 
many commentators similarly assert that expenditures may be formally independent 
while still being coordinated.  See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov-
ernment PAC:  The Beginning of the End of the Buckley Era?, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1729, 1739–
41 (2001) (discussing judicial standards for distinguishing between contributions and ex-
penditures); Daniel W. Butrymowicz, Note, Loophole.com:  How the FEC’s Failure to Fully Re-
gulate the Internet Undermines Campaign Finance Law, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1708, 1710–11 
(2009) (discussing a regulatory loophole in a rule promulgated by the Federal Election 
Commission); Dan Eggen, Mixed Reaction to New FEC Rules on Candidates, Interest Groups 
Working Together, WASHINGTONPOST.COM (Sept. 2, 2010, 12:27 PM) 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/01/
AR2010090106049. html; Eliza Newlin Carney,  Time for Obama to Right the FEC:  The Citi-
zens United Ruling has put the Election Agency on the Spot, NATIONALJOURNAL.COM (Feb. 16, 
2010), http://nationaljournal.com/columns/rules-of-the-game/time-for-obama-to-right-
the-fec-20100216?print=true; Fred Wertheimer, Supreme Court’s Corruption of Election Law, 
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spite their independence from candidates and parties, presumably 
because express endorsements are likely, or would appear likely, to 
be made in exchange for favors or to make the candidate feel behol-
den to the source of funds spent so visibly on his or her behalf.47  As a 
consequence, although it struck down dollar limits on independent 
expenditures, the Buckley Court upheld FECA’s independent expend-
iture disclosure rules “to achieve through publicity the maximum de-
terrence to corruption and undue influence possible” in addition to 
disclosure’s role in providing voters with information about sources 
of candidates’ funding.48  If individuals or groups coordinate their ac-
tivities with candidates, political parties, or their committees, the pos-
sibility of corruption or the appearance of corruption is treated by 
campaign finance law the same as if the funds were actually contri-
buted to those who benefit because coordinated actions are likely to 
create, or appear to create, political debt to the same degree as direct 
 
POLITICO (Dec. 14, 2010, 11:57 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/
1210/46410.html;. 
 47 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27–28, 45 (indicating that government concerns about “preventing 
corruption and the appearance of corruption” are insufficient to justify limitations on in-
dependent expenditures).  The Court does not categorically declare this to be the case, 
and its holding only assumes the proposition’s validity arguendo.  But this is the clear im-
plication of the Court’s comment that expenditure caps limited to express advocacy 
would leave a “loophole” for those seeking to exert “improper influence” on a candidate 
through large expenditures of money.  Id. at 45.  The Buckley Court’s prediction, of 
course, has proved correct.  Further, it is common for those who make contributions or 
expenditures classified as “independent” under FECA to have significant ties to the can-
didates or parties they are supporting.  See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 152,153–54 
(2003) (noting, as a matter of law, Congress’s concern that access to a candidate can be 
“sold” even by a group independent of the candidate and his or her campaign); id., at 
156 n.51 (stating that the close relationship between “federal officeholders and the state 
and local committees of their parties . . . makes state and local parties effective conduits 
for donors desiring to corrupt federal candidates and officeholders”); SpeechNow.org v. 
FEC, 567 F. Supp. 2d 70, 75 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting the “close relationships between party 
operatives and the persons running prominent 527 organizations (who were in some in-
stances one and the same),” although they did not “violate the letter of the law on inde-
pendence and non-coordination”).  On appeal, this decision was reversed in part and af-
firmed in part.  See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010); cert. denied, 
79 U.S.L.W. 3268. 
 48 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 76; see also FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 
431, 458–65 (2001) (arguing that party expenditures coordinated with candidates or their 
committees can be used to circumvent contribution limits and can thus be constitutional-
ly regulated to prevent corruption).  At the time these cases were decided, only individu-
als could make unlimited independent expenditures for communications expressly advo-
cating the election or defeat of a candidate.  Corporations were prohibited from making 
such expenditures.  See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b) (2006) (prohibiting contributions by corpora-
tions and labor organizations).  Citizens United overturned that prohibition.  130 S. Ct. 
876, 913 (2010). 
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contributions.49  Implicit in these rulings is the view that feelings of 
being beholden to a contributor, or political debt, are the petri dish 
in which corruption, or the appearance of corruption, can flourish.  
In contrast to the Buckley decision, Kennedy’s opinion in Citizens Unit-
ed made a point of emphasizing the informational value of disclosure 
to the exclusion of its role in deterring corruption.50  This may be due 
to the Citizens United majority’s desire, described below, to place new 
limits on the meaning of corruption for campaign finance purposes, 
which is discussed in Part III.51 
Until the Citizens United decision was handed down, FECA’s 
“source” rules prohibited corporations and labor organizations from 
spending money from their corporate or union general treasuries on 
express advocacy or electioneering communications.52  The provision 
reflected the view that potentially unlimited revenues from commer-
cial enterprises and unions should not be permitted to fund partisan 
campaigns.  Such entities were, however, free to spend unlimited 
amounts of money from their general treasuries for all election-
related communications and activities other than express advocacy or 
electioneering communications. 
The force of the general treasury funding restrictions was nar-
rowed considerably in 2007 by Wisconsin Right to Life,53 and invalidated 
 
 49 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46–47 (discussing “disguised contributions”). 
 50 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914 (referring only to the first of Buckley’s three justifica-
tions for disclosure); id. at 915–16 (stating that the Court will not examine “the Govern-
ment’s other asserted interests” because the informational function alone justifies the 
disclosure provision).  There is nothing in the Buckley passage to suggest that the Buckley 
Court considered each of the three justifications listed to provide sufficient justification 
for the burden imposed by disclosure rules.  See supra note 47–49 and accompanying text. 
 51 Infra Part III. B. 
 52 See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a), (b)(2) (2006).  For the original meaning of the technical term 
“electioneering communications,” see infra note 70.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43–44, appeared 
to assume the validity of the source rules for express advocacy, as did FEC v. Massachusetts 
Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986), and FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 152–56 
(2003).  McConnell, 540 U.S. 93, 103 (2003), which upheld the electioneering communi-
cation provision against a facial challenge, and also assumed the validity of the source 
prohibition relating to express advocacy, as did FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 
449, 455–58 (2007), which linked the electioneering communication provision of FECA 
to communications that were the functional equivalent of express advocacy.  The phrases 
“general treasury” and “general treasury funds” refer to an entity’s funds resulting from 
its business operations; these terms are contrasted, inter alia, with funds it raises for an af-
filiated political action committee (“PAC”).  Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 473–74.  
Corporations and unions were able to fund express advocacy and electioneering commu-
nications through their PACs. 
 53 Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 469–70 (narrowing the meaning of “electioneering commu-
nications” to instances in which the communication is also express advocacy or its “func-
tional equivalent”). 
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completely in 2010 by Citizens United.54  As a result, corporations and 
unions are now permitted to use the revenue accumulated from their 
business operations to fund express advocacy or any other kind of 
campaign speech.  These developments not only erased the source 
restrictions on federal campaign financing.  According to Professor 
Daniel Ortiz, as a practical matter, they threatened to undermine 
FECA’s restrictions on soft money55 as well, by casting doubt as to 
their constitutionality.56  Others agreed, and the Republican National 
Committee (RNC) went to court to have the FECA soft money restric-
tions on political parties declared unconstitutional.  In Republican Na-
tional Committee v. Federal Election Commission, the District Court for the 
District of Columbia upheld the provisions, and the Supreme Court 
affirmed the judgment, without an opinion, although Justices Scalia, 
Kennedy, and Thomas would have granted probable jurisdiction and 
accepted the case for oral argument.57 
 
 54 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 876 (overruling McConnell, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), as it ap-
plied to electioneering communications, and Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 
494 U.S. 652 (1990), as it applied to independent corporate spending).  Many commen-
tators had concluded that Wisconsin Right to Life effectively overruled the electioneering 
communication portion of McConnell.  See Christopher J. Peters, Under-the-Table Overruling, 
54 WAYNE L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2008) (stating that Wisconsin Right to Life “gutted McCon-
nell’s conclusion” that the electioneering communication provision was not unconstitu-
tionally broad); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Difference Two Justices Make:  FEC v. Wisconsin Right 
to Life, Inc. II and the Destabilization of Campaign Finance Regulation, 1 ALBANY GOV’T L. 
REV. 141, 142 (2008) (asserting that the holding in Wisconsin Right to Life II “robs the 
[electioneering communication] ban of any content”); Hasen, supra note 3 at 1065 (stat-
ing that Wisconsin Right to Life “mostly eviscerated” the ban on corporate and union soft 
money funding for pre-election sham issue ads).  Seven Justices in Wisconsin Right to Life 
agreed that the formula articulated by the Wisconsin Right to Life plurality opinion 
amounted to overruling McConnell.  See Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 497–98 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the result), 525–28 (Souter, J., dissenting).  According to Samuel Issacha-
roff, the Wisconsin Right to Life decision signaled that the Court was “poised once again to 
make a decisive move against Buckley.”  Samuel Issacharoff, The Constitutional Logic of Cam-
paign Finance Regulation, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 373, 374 (2009).  So far, however, the Court has 
framed its actions as strengthening Buckley by overruling precedents unfaithful to Buck-
ley’s teachings. 
 55 “Soft money” refers to contributions that can be raised without satisfying FECA’s disclo-
sure, amount, and source rules.  See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122–23.  It is also sometimes 
referred to as “non-federal” or “unregulated” money.  Id. at 123.  “Issue ads” can be paid 
for by “soft,”—i.e., unregulated—money, in contrast to “express advocacy,” which had to 
be paid for with “hard” money—i.e., money subject to FECA disclosure, amount, and 
source restrictions.  See id. at 122–36. 
 56 See Ortiz, supra note 54, at 162–63.  Ortiz’s article was published after Wisconsin Right to 
Life was decided, but before the decision in Catholics United.  Thus, he also warned that 
Wisconsin Right to Life effectively enabled corporations and unions to spend unlimited 
amounts of business revenues on everything short of express advocacy.  Id. at 163. 
 57 See 130 S. Ct. 3544 (2010) (affirming without opinion 698 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D.D.C. 
2010)). 
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There is, then, a stark contrast between the breadth of the con-
ception of campaign related speech subject to regulation for purpos-
es of the federal tax law and the counterpart concept in federal cam-
paign finance law.  For campaign finance law purposes, it is unclear 
whether any campaign related speech that is not a political contribu-
tion or an expenditure coordinated with a candidate or a political 
party can be subject to regulation other than the soft money and dis-
closure rules.58  Under federal income tax law, in contrast, not only 
express advocacy, but any campaign related speech or other action 
that supports or opposes a candidate for public office, may be subject 
to numerous restrictions, depending on the facts and circumstances 
of the case. 
II.  ANTITHETICAL AGENCY METHODOLOGIES 
A.  The Tax Law Facts and Circumstances Approach 
As was noted earlier, there are few bright line rules to follow to 
determine whether a given election-related activity falls within the tax 
law’s capacious understanding of political campaign activity.59  From 
the time of its earliest rulings in this area, the Service has taken the 
position that it will look at all the facts and circumstances surround-
ing an activity to determine if it is prohibited to 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions or restricted to other groups exempt under section 501(a) of 
the Code.  Making these determinations, of course, can involve the 
agency in complex and nuanced examinations. 
The character of the Service’s facts and circumstances test is cap-
tured by a Revenue Ruling issued in 2004.60  The ruling sets out six 
 
 58 The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 
81, enacted, and the McConnell Court upheld, regulation of communications funded by 
state parties or committees, that “support” or “oppose” candidates for federal office.  See 2 
U.S.C. §§ 431(20), 441b(b); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170–71 (declining to strike down the 
provision and giving deference to Congress).  It is uncertain whether the Supreme Court 
will in the future conclude that such communications are independent.  See Miriam Gals-
ton, Emerging Constitutional Paradigms and Justifications for Campaign Finance Regulation:  The 
Case of 527 Groups, 95 GEO. L.J. 1181, 1210–11 (2007) (discussing the relationship be-
tween such state funded communications and coordinated expenditures). 
 59 Express advocacy would necessarily be classified as campaign activity for federal tax law 
purposes, as would contributing money to, or coordinating with, a campaign. 
 60 See Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-1 C.B. 328.  In 2007, the Service issued another ruling that col-
lected and, in some instances restated, its positions in previously issued rulings and other 
administrative materials.  See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421.  Rev. Rul. 2004-6 ex-
amines the “public advocacy” activities of 501(c) groups other than charities to see if they 
would be “exempt function” activities were they carried out by a 527 political organiza-
tion.  If they are, the 501(c) group may be subject to tax.  See supra note 30.  Because the 
886 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:4 
 
situations in which an organization exempt under section 501(c)(4), 
501(c)(5), or 501(c)(6) funds one or more broadcast or print adver-
tisements in the weeks preceding an election.  Several additional facts 
are common to all six situations.  In each, the nonprofit funds a 
communication discussing an issue of concern to the group and 
urges whoever hears or reads the ad to contact a named public offi-
cial to urge him or her to take some action consistent with the non-
profit’s agenda, and in each, the public official is a candidate in the 
coming election.61  Thus, all the situations have numerous facts that 
suggest, although they do not necessitate, that the organization spon-
soring the ad is attempting to influence the outcome of the election 
by portraying a candidate for public office as in favor of, or in opposi-
tion to, the group’s objectives. 
At the same time, each situation described in the Revenue Ruling 
might also be interpreted as grassroots lobbying or issue advocacy, 
which would not be considered campaign intervention under the 
Code.  For example, in each situation the group urges the recipients 
of the communication to ask the official named to fund an endeavor 
the group cares about, to support or veto a legislative initiative, or to 
oppose capital punishment.  Under the tax law rules elaborated by 
the Service, sponsoring lobbying messages of this kind is permitted to 
501(c)(3) groups up to a certain limit and is permitted to a nonprofit 
described in other subsections of 501(c) without any limit as long as 
the subject of the lobbying is germane to the organization’s mission.62 
The 2004 Revenue Ruling describes the types of facts and circums-
tances that will determine whether, on balance, the Service considers 
the nonprofit in each of the six situations to be engaged in campaign 
intervention, on the one hand, or grass roots lobbying or issue advo-
 
exempt function of a 527 organization is “influencing or attempting to influence the se-
lection, nomination, election, or appointment” of individuals to public office, IRC 
527(e)(2), the discussion in Rev. Rul. 2004–6 clarifies what activities will be considered 
political campaign activities for 501(c)(3) groups as well as other groups described in 
501(c). 
 61 For example, a candidate for governor of a state may be asked to take a certain position 
regarding an imminent death penalty execution or a candidate for a legislature may be 
urged to vote for or against a legislative proposal.  See Rev. Rul. 2004–6 2004–1 C.B. 332 
(Situation 5). 
 62 Charities described in section 501(c) can lobby as long as the lobbying is not “substan-
tial.”  See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006);  Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)–1(b)(3)(i), (c)(3)(ii).  
Nonprofits exempt under other subsections of section 501(c) can lobby without limit in 
furtherance of their exempt purposes.  See Rev. Rul. 71-530, 1971-2 C.B. 237-38 (holding 
that although an “organization’s only activities may involve advocating changes in law,” 
that does not preclude the organization from tax exemption); Rev. Rul. 67-187, 1967-1 
C.B. 185; Rev. Rul. 61–177, 1961–2 C.B. 117 (501(c)(6) groups). 
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cacy, on the other.  For example, if the communication being ques-
tioned is part of a series of similar public messages sponsored by the 
organization over a period of time, including times not scheduled to 
coincide with an election, the pre-election message is less likely to be 
considered campaign activity.63  Similarly, if the pre-election message 
is linked to a specific event occurring near the time of the election, 
the pre-election message is more likely to be considered grassroots 
lobbying, especially if the non-election event is outside the organiza-
tion’s control.  For example, if an execution is scheduled to take 
place shortly before or after the election in that state and the organi-
zation’s pre-election message deplores capital punishment and urges 
citizens to call Governor X and tell him to place a moratorium on ex-
ecutions because of racial unfairness in sentencing patterns, the mes-
sage might be classified as grassroots lobbying, even if capital pu-
nishment is a wedge issue in the Governor’s race in that state.64  
These facts would not, however, prevent the Service from finding that 
the organization sponsoring the message was engaged in campaign 
activity if the external event allegedly motivating the message was a 
bill in the state legislature, say, to end capital punishment and it 
could be shown that the sponsoring organization had influenced the 
date on which the vote in the legislature was scheduled so it would 
coincide with the election.  Other facts possibly suggesting the exis-
tence of campaign activity would be a statement in the ad that the 
official to be contacted supports or opposes the position favored by 
the nonprofit,65 even if the ad avoids stating whether he or she is, or is 
not, fit to hold that office. 
The balancing method utilized by the Service in Revenue Ruling 
2004–6 is identical to the method it has employed in Revenue Rulings 
 
 63 See Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-1 C.B. 330 (Situation 1), 332 (Situation 5) (describing circums-
tances in which issue advertisements create no tax exposure because they are  not cam-
paign activity). 
 64 Compare Rev. Rul. 2004–6, 2004–1 C.B. 332 (Situation 5) (stating that where an execution 
had been scheduled and the message was part of a series, the pre-election message was 
not campaign activity even though the candidate’s position was identified as opposed to 
that of the organization), with id. at 332 (Situation 6) (stating that where there was no ex-
ternal event scheduled and the message was not part of an series, the pre-election mes-
sage was campaign activity). 
 65 See Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-1 C.B. 330 (Situation 1), 332 (Situation 6) (stating that adver-
tisements which do not identify the official’s position on the relevant issue may not be 
considered campaign activity, while advertisements which appear just before the election 
involving an oppositional candidate, and which target that candidate’s opinion, are likely 
to be classified as campaign activity).  But see id. at 332 (Situation 5) and supra note 61 
(stating that advertisements which appear just before an election involving an opposing 
candidate but which are part of an ongoing series of substantially similar advocacy com-
munications are not necessarily campaign activity).  
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discussing voter education and other types of activities that can be 
partisan or nonpartisan—and thus campaign intervention or not for 
Code purposes—depending upon the manner in which they are 
conducted.66  At bottom, it entails the exercise of judgment to identify 
significant facts, interpret them in light of the context in which they 
occur, and determine the weight to accord to each. 
B. The Campaign Finance Law Bright Line Approach 
Although a facts and circumstances test may seem a reasonable 
way to appreciate the complex character of an organization’s elec-
tion-related activities, the probing and balancing method it employs 
contrasts sharply with the bright line rule approach favored by the 
Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo and subsequent decisions, and reas-
serted by the plurality opinion in Wisconsin Right to Life. 
The Buckley Court originally enunciated the express advocacy 
bright line rule in response to its concern that the vague “for the 
purpose of influencing a federal election” language in campaign 
finance law would have the effect of chilling non-campaign speech, 
especially the discussion of ideas and candidates.67  The Buckley Court 
did not claim that all campaign-related speech other than express ad-
vocacy was discussion of ideas and candidates.  Rather, it noted that it 
could be difficult to distinguish core campaign speech (urging the 
public to vote for or against a candidate) from other forms of politi-
cal speech and issue discussion.68  The express advocacy rule was a re-
sponse to this dilemma, since it created a bright line rule to differen-
tiate political speech not subject to campaign finance regulation from 
speech that may be regulated. 
The electioneering communication provisions enacted in 2002 as 
part of the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform69 were de-
signed by Congress to add an additional, and important, category of 
campaign speech that should be funded with hard money and subject 
to FECA disclosure while respecting Buckley’s preference for bright 
 
 66 See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text (describing circumstances in which debates 
hosted by a non-profit organization may be seen as non-partisan); Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 
2007-1 C.B. 1421-26 (distinguishing permissible “voter education” activities from imper-
missible campaign interventions). 
 67 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 76–80 (1976) (per curiam) (construing section 434(e) to 
apply only to express advocacy in order to avoid invalidation on vagueness grounds). 
 68 See id. at 78–79 (noting the line-drawing problems that arise in trying to distinguish issue 
advocacy from “advocacy of a political result”). 
 69 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81. 
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line rules.70  In upholding the constitutionality of these provisions, 
the McConnell Court appears to have endorsed the bright line rule 
approach as well.71  In ruling that regulation of electioneering com-
munications was constitutional, the Court noted that there was no va-
gueness problem because the criteria listed in the definition were 
both “easily understood and objectively determinable.”72 
In Wisconsin Right to Life, however, the Supreme Court rejected the 
electioneering communication provision, despite the fact that it 
created a bright line rule, because the provision could apply to more 
than express advocacy or its “functional equivalent.”73  At the same 
time, the Court reiterated its commitment to a bright line standard, 
emphasizing that campaign finance provisions should not be appli-
cable in a way that “open[s] the door to a trial” on every communica-
tion an organization contemplates funding or necessitate elaborate 
discovery.74  For the plurality Wisconsin Right to Life opinion, that 
meant rejecting the FEC’s intent-and-effect test for classifying cam-
paign ads, because the FEC’s test would require examining the larger 
context within which political communications were designed and 
broadcast.75  The opinion strengthened its “four-corners-of-the-text” 
approach by asserting that, if evidence of the existence of campaign 
activity and evidence of issues advocacy are equal, “the tie goes to the 
 
 70 As originally enacted, an electioneering communication was defined as a communication 
referring to a candidate for public office, distributed through broadcast media, and tar-
geted to a certain number of persons able to vote for (or against) the candidate, if the 
communication occurred in the thirty days preceding a primary or the sixty days preced-
ing a general election.  Id. § 201(a); Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 
434(f)(3)(A),(C) (2000). 
 71 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 194 (2003) (rejecting the constitutional objections to 
the new definition of “electioneering communication” under the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act).  The McConnell Court also upheld the constitutionality of a more indetermi-
nate support/oppose standard, but only with regard to state and local political parties.  
See id. at 166–71 (determining that the provision’s restrictions are “closely drawn” to serve 
the Government’s objectives and rejecting arguments that they are overbroad and vague). 
 72 Id. at 194. 
 73 FEC v. Wis. Right to Life Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 466–67 (2007).  The Court attributed the re-
quirement that electioneering communications be express advocacy or its functional 
equivalent to the McConnell Court, id. at 465, although the four dissenting justices in Wis-
consin Right to Life, who were part of the majority in McConnell, were adamant that this in-
terpretation was not the opinion of the McConnell Court.  See id. at 526–28 (J. Souter, dis-
senting) (arguing that the majority’s new test is “flatly contrary” to McConnell). 
 74 See id. at 466–69 (asserting that the standard “must entail minimal if any discovery, to al-
low parties to resolve dispute quickly without chilling speech through the threat of bur-
densome litigation.”). 
 75 See id. at 466–69 (declining “to adopt a test for as-applied challenges turning on the 
speaker’s intent to affect an election”). 
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speaker, not the censor.”76  The practical effect of the Wisconsin Right 
to Life analysis is thus to create a presumption that political speech 
that is not express advocacy must be deemed to be issue discussion or 
grassroots lobbying until proven otherwise, and to require the gov-
ernment to satisfy this burden of proof without utilizing evidence that 
a court could consider more than minimally contextual.77 
The Citizens United decision left this part of Wisconsin Right to Life’s 
doctrine intact.  Thus, the method now employed by the IRS to de-
termine whether a nonprofit organization has intervened in a politi-
cal campaign is exactly the method the Court rejected in Wisconsin 
Right to Life, namely, a facts and circumstances test that entails taking 
into account the larger context in which a communication or other 
activity occurs.  Additionally, in federal tax cases, the organization 
seeking to avoid violating the campaign prohibition has the burden 
of proof,78 whereas the effect of Wisconsin Right to Life’s tie breaking 
rule is to place the burden of proof on the government, even as it re-
stricts the government’s access to arguably relevant information. 
III. JUDICIAL SCRUTINY:  STRICT OR LIGHT 
First Amendment issues have arisen repeatedly in connection with 
tax law regulations.  In general, judicial controversies involving a First 
Amendment challenge to the denial of tax exemption or tax deduc-
tion have developed a doctrine independent of First Amendment ju-
risprudence operating in other areas involving free speech.  As is true 
in other areas of First Amendment law, if there is no burden on a 
protected right, the courts subject the government’s actions to the ra-
tional relation test, the lightest form of judicial scrutiny in the free 
speech area.79  If, on the other hand, the government’s actions are 
seen as burdening the speech rights of the affected party, the courts 
use some form of heightened scrutiny to determine whether the gov-
ernment has subjected the affected party to an unconstitutional con-
dition on the receipt of a governmental benefit.  What is unique in 
 
 76 Id. at 474. 
 77 The plurality opinion did agree that some recourse to context would be valid under its 
interpretation of the constitutional constraints.  See id. at 473–74 (“Courts need not ig-
nore basic background information that may be necessary to put an ad in context . . . .”). 
 78 See Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940) (“The burden is on the one attacking the 
legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.”). 
 79 See Regan v. Taxation with Representation (TWR), 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983) (judging the 
lobbying restrictions on 501(c)(3) organizations as “not irrational”); Madden, 309 U.S. at 
88 (“[T]he presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit 
demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against par-
ticular persons and classes.”). 
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the tax area is that, as a general matter, denying taxpayers tax bene-
fits is not seen as burdening their speech. 
A. The Deferential Tax Law Approach 
The tax law First Amendment decisions are, in general, deferen-
tial to government restrictions limiting taxpayers’ entitlement to de-
ductions or exemptions because courts are reluctant to second guess 
lawmakers’ determinations in the area of tax.  Highlighting the high 
level of its deference, the Supreme Court in Madden v. Kentucky as-
serted that a legislature’s tax classifications have “a presumption of 
constitutionality.”80  Although this presumption exists in many areas 
of the law, the Madden Court noted that the government’s discretion 
in tax classifications is even greater than it is in other fields.81  As a co-
rollary, the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence in tax 
cases presumes that “statutory classifications are valid if they bear a 
rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose.”82  Because of 
this presumption, the “burden is on the one attacking the legislative 
arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support 
it.”83 
If, however, tax classifications burden “the exercise of a funda-
mental right, such as freedom of speech, or employ a suspect classifi-
cation, such as race,” courts will employ “a higher level of scrutiny.”84  
Further, courts will subject to “strict scrutiny” any affirmative burden 
that the government places on speech on the basis of its content.85  
 
 80 Madden, 309 U.S. at 88 (cited in TWR, 461 U.S. at 547). 
 81 See Madden, 309 U.S. at 87–88 (noting the broad discretion given to legislatures in the 
field of taxation). 
 82 TWR, 461 U.S. at 547.  There is some ambiguity in the statement, however, since the full 
sentence reads, “Generally, statutory classifications are valid. . . [,]” id., and, as discussed 
below, the Court will subject statutes to a higher level of scrutiny in certain circumstances. 
 83 Madden, 309 U.S. at 88. 
 84 TWR, 461 U.S. at 547.  This might seem to imply that the lobbying restriction at issue in 
the case should have been reviewed with a higher level of scrutiny than the rational rela-
tion test since the restriction affects freedom of speech.  However, the TWR Court does 
not employ heightened scrutiny.  This apparent inconsistency is reconciled by the Court’s 
holding that a failure to subsidize does not, in and of itself, constitute a burden and does 
not infringe the right.  See id. at 549 (“We have held in several contexts that a legislature’s 
decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right, 
and thus is not subject to strict scrutiny.”). 
 85 See, e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) (“[F]or reasons that are obvious, a 
tax will trigger heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment if it discriminates on the 
basis of the content of taxpayer speech.”); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244–
50 (1936) (noting that the First Amendment prohibits imposing a tax on newspapers with 
a large circulation when the goal of the tax is to limit the spread of information).  See also 
infra notes 102–108 and accompanying text (discussing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 
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Judicial deference to legislative judgments in tax cases thus may be 
diminished in certain instances involving the First Amendment, al-
though the level of scrutiny or deference has not always been clearly 
articulated.86  Importantly for the comparison between tax law and 
campaign finance law, tax statutes that selectively exempt, or fail to 
exempt, specific categories of speakers are not necessarily “constitu-
tionally suspect.”87  They only trigger heightened scrutiny if in addi-
tion they discriminate on the basis of content, run the risk of sup-
pressing specific ideas or points of view, target the press, or target a 
“small group of speakers.”88 
The seminal case in this area, Cammarano v. United States, reveals 
how the Supreme Court determines whether the threshold condition 
for “a higher level of scrutiny” is present, i.e., whether a fundamental 
right has been burdened.  In that decision, the Court upheld a provi-
sion of the Code that denied taxpayers an otherwise valid business 
expense deduction for the cost of lobbying against a ballot initiative 
that, if passed, would harm their business.89  The taxpayers had ar-
gued that the Code provision denied them a business expense deduc-
tion because of their involvement in constitutionally protected First 
Amendment speech.  In rejecting their claim, the Court countered 
that the taxpayers’ exercise of free speech was not burdened by the 
denial of a deduction.  Rather, according to the Court, the taxpayers 
were only being required to pay for their lobbying activities without a 
government subsidy.90  For First Amendment activities, in other 
words, denial of a subsidy did not infringe on the exercise of a fun-
damental right.  As a result, the application of heightened scrutiny 
was not warranted.91 
 
529 (1958), in which the Court struck down a property tax exemption requirement that 
the taxpayer execute a loyalty oath). 
 86 See the discussion of levels of scrutiny in Am. Soc’y of Ass’n Executives v. United States, 23 F. 
Supp. 2d 64, 68–69 (D.D.C. 1998), aff’d, 195 F.3d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 87 Leathers, 499 U.S. at 444.  See also infra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 88 Leathers, 499 U.S. at 447. 
 89 See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 499–500 (1959) (discussing the harmful 
effects of the measures). 
 90 See id., 358 U.S. at 512–13 (stating that denying the taxpayers a deduction deprived them 
not of free speech, but of free speech at the government’s expense).  In his concurrence, 
Justice Douglas observed that the First Amendment would have been violated only if 
Congress had denied all deductions for ordinary and necessary expenses to a taxpayer 
who lobbied.  Id., 358 U.S. at 515 (Douglas, J. concurring). 
 91 There is no discussion of the level of scrutiny in the decision.  The First Amendment por-
tion of the challenge is disposed of in a single paragraph that distinguishes the “nondi-
scriminatory denial of [a] deduction” from “‘the suppression of dangerous ideas.’”  See 
id., 358 U.S. at 513 (rejecting the idea that the plaintiffs were denied tax deductions be-
cause of engaging in constitutionally protected activities). 
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In dicta in Cammarano, the Supreme Court compared the policy 
underlying the ban on business deductions for lobbying expenses 
with the policy embodied in the provision of the tax law denying cha-
ritable tax exemption to otherwise qualified 501(c)(3) organizations 
if they engage in a substantial amount of lobbying.92  More than two 
decades later, in Taxation with Representation, the constitutionality of 
this limit on lobbying by charities was itself subject to a direct chal-
lenge.  The Supreme Court reiterated the teaching of Cammarano 
that denying 501(c)(3) organizations a subsidy is not an infringement 
upon speech, and the Court expanded Cammarano by stating that 
strict scrutiny would not be required even if Congress chose to pro-
vide a tax subsidy selectively, e.g., to some but not all categories of 
exempt organizations.93  As a result, the Court ruled against the pub-
lic interest organization in the case, which had been denied 
501(c)(3) charitable exemption because it proposed to lobby in 
excess of the statutory lobbying limit.94 
The Supreme Court addressed the relationship between tax classi-
fications and burdens on First Amendment freedoms again in 1989, 
in Hernandez v. Commissioner.  At issue in that decision was the taxpay-
er plaintiffs’ entitlement to section 170 charitable contribution de-
ductions for the cost of spiritual classes conducted by trainers of the 
Church of Scientology.  The plaintiffs claimed that denying them 
such deductions for the classes unconstitutionally “deter[red] adhe-
rents from engaging in [religious] auditing and training sessions.”95  
The Court, however, doubted that the “alleged burden” on the tax-
payers’ free exercise of their religion was substantial because the ef-
fect of denying them the deductions was merely to increase the cost 
of the classes.96  The Court’s holding in Hernandez is consistent with its 
view, expressed in non-tax contexts, that economic hardship resulting 
from a denial of government benefits does not necessarily implicate 
 
 92 See id., 358 U.S at 512–13 (comparing the policies). 
 93 See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington (TWR), 461 U.S. 540, 548 
(1983) (declining to apply strict scrutiny to provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that 
discriminated between lobbying organizations); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 
192–93 (1991) (upholding regulations which prohibited providers from discussing abor-
tion as a lawful option because such regulations were permissible conditions for funding); 
Leathers, 499 U.S. at 450 (citing TWR and Cammarano with approval). 
 94 See Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 512–13 (upholding the Internal Revenue Code provision).  
Under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006) and the associated regulations, an organization can en-
gage only in an “insubstantial” amount of lobbying. 
 95 Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 698 (1989). 
 96 See id. at 699 (questioning the substantiality of the burden). 
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the Constitution, even when First Amendment protections are af-
fected.97 
In both Cammarano and Taxation with Representation, the Supreme 
Court discussed the government’s stated goal, that political 
“[c]ontroversies . . . must be conducted without public subvention; 
the Treasury stands aside from them.”98  In both cases, the Court em-
phasized that as a constitutional matter, “a legislature’s decision not 
to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the 
right . . . .”99  Thus, the government’s goal of securing its own neutral-
ity and a level playing field for those who lobby was subjected to a 
minimal burden of justification.100  As the Cammarano Court ex-
plained, “since purchased publicity can influence the fate of legisla-
tion which will affect, directly or indirectly, all in the community, eve-
ryone in the community should stand on the same footing as regards 
its purchase so far as the Treasury of the United States is con-
cerned.”101 
A tax classification, or a failure to subsidize a fundamental right, 
nonetheless may violate the Constitution if a legislature’s action in-
volves content discrimination or the intent to suppress certain ideas, 
as occurred in Speiser v. Randall.102  In that case, a provision of the Cal-
ifornia Constitution and implementing legislation denied the State’s 
veterans property tax exemption to any veteran who failed to sign a 
loyalty oath stating that the signatory did not advocate the violent 
overthrow of the government nor support a foreign nation at war 
with the United States.103  The exemption in question was sought by 
certain World War II veterans who had received honorable discharges 
and refused to sign the oath.104  The Supreme Court concluded that 
the constitutional provision should be interpreted to mean what the 
 
 97 See infra notes 176–86 and accompanying text. 
 98 Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 512 (citing Slee v. Comm’r, 42 F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 99 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington (TWR), 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983); 
see also Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 515 (Douglas, J., concurring) (criticizing “the notion that 
First Amendment rights are somehow not fully realized unless they are subsidized by the 
State”). 
100 See discussion supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
101 Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513. 
102 See TWR, 461 U.S. at 548 (citing Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 
357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958))); see also Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 450 (1991) (noting 
that a tax scheme which discriminates on the basis of a speaker’s ideas violates the First 
Amendment).  In Speiser, the Court struck down statutory provision, itself based upon a 
provision of the California constitution that denied a property tax exemption to persons 
who did not sign a loyalty oath.  357 U.S. at 529. 
103 Speiser, 357 U.S. at 515. 
104 Id. at 514–15. 
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California Supreme Court said it meant, i.e., that it applied only to 
those who actually engaged in speech that would be criminally pu-
nishable under California criminal law and not to abstract advocacy.105  
Thus construed, the loyalty oath was unconstitutional because it im-
posed on individuals failing to sign the oath an unreasonable condi-
tion, namely, the burden of proving they were not in violation of 
criminal law.106  This violated the applicants’ due process rights be-
cause the state’s reliance on a “short-cut” procedure (the oath) to de-
termine whether people had violated a criminal statute might well 
have the effect of infringing upon their free speech.107 
The Speiser Court said explicitly that the loyalty oath required by 
California was “‘frankly aimed at the suppression of ideas.’”108  When 
such factual situations arise, a heightened form of scrutiny, i.e., more 
than the rational relation test, is required to determine if the regula-
tion in question is constitutional.  Subsequent tax law decisions have 
distinguished Speiser’s holding when explaining why a particular go-
vernmental action is valid.109  These tax cases are consistent with, and 
sometimes cite, First Amendment decisions in other areas of the law 
invalidating government discrimination based upon the content of 
speech or designed to suppress dangerous ideas.110 
Tax cases involving speech restrictions in connection with deduc-
tions or exemptions are portrayed by the Supreme Court as a subset 
of cases involving a government subsidy or grant.111  In some non-tax 
 
105 See id. at 519–20 (construing the constitutional provision). 
106 See id. at 523–24 (determining that the loyalty oath violates the fundamental principle 
that an individual should not be considered presumptively guilty of a crime). 
107 See id. at 528–29 (holding that the provision’s enforcement procedures violate due 
process).  However, neither signing nor failing to sign the oath was conclusive as to an 
applicant’s entitlement to the exemption.  See id. at 521 n.6 (noting that it may be neces-
sary for the claimant to allege and prove facts to justify the exemption). 
108 Id. at 519 (quoting Am. Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,402 (1950)). 
109 See, e.g., Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ 
analogy to Speiser on the ground that there was no suppression of ideas in the tax statute); 
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington (TWR), 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983) 
(noting the outcome would be different if the tax provision involved “the suppression of 
dangerous ideas . . . .”). 
110 See, e.g., Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972) (invalidating summary judgment 
for a state college that failed to renew a faculty member on the grounds that the nonre-
newal may have been a result of the fact that the faculty member had criticized the school 
publicly, including before a legislative committee).  See also FCC v. League of Women 
Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383–84 (1984) (invalidating a regulation prohibiting nonprofit 
broadcast stations that were recipients of federal funds from editorializing, which, the 
Court said, was suppression of speech based upon content). 
111 See, e.g., TWR, 461 U.S. at 544 (stating that “tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a 
form of subsidy that is administered through the tax system.”).  The equation of deduc-
tions and/or exemptions with subsidies has been challenged by numerous commentators.  
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subsidy cases, the Court’s analysis is framed in terms of the nature 
and validity of the conditions the government has placed on the reci-
pient, or potential recipient, of government funds.112  In general, 
these cases examine the type of government benefit involved, the 
character of the right affected by the condition imposed, the degree 
of the burden imposed by the condition, the importance of the gov-
ernment’s reason for imposing the condition, and the relationship 
between the government’s purpose and the means chosen to achieve 
it.113 
Subsidy cases are not, however, necessarily analyzed within this 
framework.  For example, in Rust v. Sullivan, the plaintiff organiza-
tion challenged a speech restriction imposed upon the receipt of 
federal funds as an unconstitutional condition.114  In rejecting the 
claim that this was an unconstitutional condition case, the Court said 
 
See, e.g., William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 
309, 344–45, 365–66 (1972); Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Non-
profit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 304–307, 357–58 (1976) 
(arguing  that “nonprofit organizations engaged in ‘public service’ activities, broadly con-
ceived, should be wholly exempted from income taxation . . . .”); Evelyn Brody, Of Sove-
reignty and Subsidy, Conceptualizing the Charitable Tax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585 (1998); 
Johnny Rex Buckles, Do Law Schools Forfeit Federal Income Tax Exemption When They Deny Mil-
itary Recruiters Full Access to Career Services Programs?:  The Hypothetical Case of Yale University 
v. Commissioner, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 42–45 (2009) (discussing several alternative theories 
to the “subsidy theory”); see also Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 679–80 
(1970) (asserting that a property tax exemption for a church does not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause because it is not a subsidy in every respect); Johnny Rex Buckles, The 
Community Income Theory of the Charitable Contributions Deduction, 80 IND. L.J. 947, 952–53 
(2005) (developing a non-subsidy theory of the charitable contribution deduction).  For 
an overview of this area, see Rob Atkinson, Theories of Federal Income Tax Exemption:  Thesis, 
Antithesis, and Synthesis, 27 STETSON L. REV. 395 (1997). 
112 See e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543–49 (2001) (reviewing the con-
ditions of funding in the LSC Act). 
113 On the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions as applied in tax exemption and deduc-
tion cases, see John Simon, Harvey Dale, & Laura Chisolm, The Federal Tax Treatment of 
Charitable Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR:  A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 267, 276 
(Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg, eds. 2006) (concluding that the area is sufficient-
ly murky that accurate predictions are impossible).  The literature discussing the doctrine 
of unconstitutional conditions is voluminous.  Some of the classic articles are David Cole, 
Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions:  Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675 (1992); Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, 
and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); Daniel A. Farber, Another View of the 
Quagmire:  Unconstitutional Conditions and Contract Theory, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913 
(2006); Frederick Schauer, Too Hard:  Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of Consti-
tutional Consistency, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 989 (1995); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional 
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989).  In the words of Steven Gey, “Virtually every-
one agrees that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is a mess.”  Steven G. Gey, Con-
tracting Away Rights:  A Comment on Daniel Farber’s “Another View of the Quagmire,” 33 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 953, 953 (2006). 
114 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192 (1991). 
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our ‘unconstitutional conditions’ cases involve situations in which the 
Government has placed a condition on the recipient of the subsidy rather 
than on a particular program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the 
recipient from engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of 
the federally funded program.115 
Rust involved Title X funding, and the speech restriction required 
recipients of Title X money to abstain from informing patients of 
abortion as a possible option for them to consider as part of family 
planning.116  The Court concluded nonetheless that grant recipients 
were not prevented from counseling about abortion because they 
were free to engage in such counseling using premises that were 
physically separate from the facility receiving Title X funds.117  In sup-
port of its finding, the Court cited a passage in Federal Communications 
Commission v. League of Women Voters, to the effect that the speech re-
striction on government funding in that case would have been 
upheld if Congress had authorized the grant recipients to establish 
affiliated entities to engage in the restricted speech without federal 
funds.118  Thus, League of Women Voters, and Rust agree that if an alter-
nate channel119 exists for speakers to engage in the type of speech re-
stricted by a federal grant or subsidy, there is no burden (as a matter 
of law)120 and, a fortiori, no unconstitutional condition.121  Hence, the 
validity of the restriction can be justified employing only a rational 
basis test.  To support their alternative channel argument, both deci-
sions cite Taxation with Representation of Washington,122 a tax decision 
discussed below. 
 
115 Id. at 197. 
116  Id. at 180. 
117 Id. at 196. 
118 Id. (citing FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 400 (1984) (citing Regan v. 
Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983))). 
119 On the alternate channel doctrine, see infra pp. 154–158 and accompanying text. 
120 Courts will concede that there is an economic burden, but an economic burden does not 
imply the existence of a legal burden.  See supra note 97 and infra notes 176–86. 
121 Arguably Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez should be included in this list.  In that case, the 
Court found that the absence of an alternative channel for indigent clients of federally 
subsidized legal services was an important factor leading it to invalidate the funding re-
striction imposed by Congress.  See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 546–49 
(2001) (invalidating the provision).  However, the Court also said that the restriction 
“suppressed speech inherent in the nature of the medium” (lawyering), id. at 543, and in-
terfered with the judicial function.  Id. at 546.  Thus, it is unclear how the Court would 
have ruled had there been an alternate channel for the plaintiff’s clients. 
122 See infra notes 151–59 and accompanying text. 
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B. The Heightened Scrutiny of Campaign Finance Law 
Outside the tax area, the Supreme Court generally employs strict 
scrutiny or some other type of heightened scrutiny in cases involving 
restrictions on free speech.  As formulated in Turner Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, content-based restric-
tions are subject to strict scrutiny and content neutral restrictions are 
evaluated by “intermediate scrutiny.”123  These standards have been 
applied in a wide range of circumstances involving regulation of indi-
viduals, non-business associations, corporations, the press, and other 
types of media. 
When campaign finance regulation is involved, however, the Su-
preme Court usually examines the regulations burdening speech us-
ing strict scrutiny.124  The strict scrutiny standard typically entails de-
termining whether restrictions on speech serve a compelling state 
interest and whether the restrictions are narrowly tailored to further 
that interest.125  Starting with Buckley and continuing through Citizens 
United, the Supreme Court has maintained repeatedly and emphati-
cally that the only compelling state interest justifying the regulation 
of campaign speech is the need to prevent corruption or the appear-
ance of corruption.126 
On several occasions, the Court has equated preventing influence 
over elected officials or access to them with the compelling state in-
terest in preventing corruption or its appearance.  For example, Buck-
ley portrayed “undue influence” alongside of “corruption” as the ob-
jective that campaign finance regulations could legitimately seek to 
deter.127  In Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal 
 
123 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641–42 (1994) (basing this observation 
upon earlier Supreme Court decisions). 
124 Usually, but not always.  See infra notes 142–45 and accompanying text. 
125 See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007) (discussing the strict scrutiny 
standard as it relates to political speech); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 205 (2003).  Not 
all courts use the phrase “strict scrutiny.”  The Court in Buckley, for example, said that re-
strictions affecting the First Amendment must be examined with “exacting scrutiny.”  
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam).  This has usually been equated with 
strict scrutiny.  See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 291 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part and 
concurring in part).  For a succinct statement of the strict scrutiny doctrine, with which 
he vehemently disagrees, see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and 
Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2418–24 (1996). 
126 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25–26 (finding that an $1,000 contribution limitation imposed by 
an Act was sufficiently supported by the Act’s primary purpose of limiting “the actuality 
and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contribu-
tions . . . .”); Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 901–02 (2010) (describing the view of 
Buckley, with which the Court agreed). 
127 See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. 
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Campaign Committee, the Court affirmed its understanding that cor-
ruption means “not only . . . quid pro quo agreements, but al-
so . . . undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the ap-
pearance of such influence.”128  As recently as the McConnell v. Federal 
Election Commission, the Supreme Court stated that campaign finance 
regulation is justified to “prevent the selling of [which] gives rise to 
the appearance of corruption.”129  Relatedly, numerous Supreme 
Court decisions have stressed that avoiding the appearance of corrup-
tion is a compelling state interest in addition to avoiding corruption 
itself.  In Buckley, for example, the Court said 
[o]f almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrange-
ments is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from pub-
lic awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large 
individual financial contributions . . . Congress could legitimately con-
clude that the avoidance of the appearance of improper influence ‘is also crit-
ical . . . if confidence in the system of representative Government is not 
to be eroded to a disastrous extent.’130 
This passage in Buckley has been repeated numerous times in subse-
quent Court decisions.131 
In Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, the Supreme Court 
enlarged the notion of corruption to include certain situations in 
which the members or shareholders of a corporation do not necessar-
ily approve the political choices funded by it,132 an idea first endorsed 
in dicta by the Court in Massachusetts Citizens for Life.133  In Citizens 
United, however, the Court repudiated this understanding of a com-
 
128 FEC v. Col. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colorado II), 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001) 
(emphasis added) (holding “that a party’s coordinated expenditures, unlike expenditures 
truly independent, may be restricted to minimize circumvention of the Act’s contribution 
limits”). 
129 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 154; see also FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210 
(1982) (acknowledging the traditionally recognized “governmental interest in preventing 
both actual corruption and the appearance of corruption of elected representa-
tives . . . .”). 
130 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 (quoting Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 
548, 565 (1973)) (second emphasis added). 
131 See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388–89 (2000); Davis v. FEC, 128 S. 
Ct. at 2770; Col. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC (“Colorado I”), 518 U.S. 604, 
609 (1996); FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496–97 
(1985); FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982); Citizens Against 
Rent Control/Coal. for Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, Cal., 454 U.S. 290, 296–97 (1981). 
132 494 U.S. 652, 663 (1990) (noting that shareholders that disagree with the Chamber’s po-
litical activity may not withdraw their funds because they want to benefit from its non-
political activities); see FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 159 n.5 (2003) (discussing wheth-
er the risk of corruption is sufficient to support regulation of political contributions). 
133 See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986) (asserting that “the power of 
the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas”). 
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pelling governmental purpose, expressly overruling Austin.134  In addi-
tion, the Court made clear its intention to limit the concept of cor-
ruption to quid pro quo corruption rather than access or influence,135 
thereby adopting a position that several justices had endorsed in dis-
sent for many years.136  Perhaps because of that history of dissent, the 
majority in Citizens United (which included all of the dissenters wish-
ing to limit corruption in this way) failed to acknowledge the discre-
pancy between its view and the view of majorities of the Court in pre-
vious cases137—another example of stealth overruling by the Roberts 
Court.138  Unexpectedly, the Citizens United Court also noted that sev-
eral times in the past the Supreme Court had observed that campaign 
finance “restrictions on direct contributions are preventative, because 
few if any contributions to candidates will involve quid pro quo ar-
rangements.”139  Thus, despite all of its jurisprudential belt tightening, 
the Citizens United Court did not strike down certain provisions pre-
venting corruption or its appearance indirectly, i.e., provisions that 
prevent circumvention of the quid pro quo prohibition. 
Employing a corruption standard to limit government regulation 
of political speech, the Supreme Court has struck down:  1) spending 
limits for candidates for Congress and state elections; 2) limits on in-
dependent expenditures, a prohibition against corporate and union 
political advertisements on the eve of elections paid for with soft 
money; 3) a prohibition against certain advocacy organizations using 
their general corporate funds for campaign expenditures; and 4) 
special financing rules for candidates running against high wealth, 
 
134 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 901, 903–13 (2010) (stating that Austin provides 
“no basis for allowing the Government to limit corporate independent expenditures,” as 
it was overruled). 
135 See id. at 909–10. 
136 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 290–93 (2003) (Kennedy, J., with whom Justices Scalia 
and Thomas joined, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that Buckley li-
mited the government’s compelling interest to quid pro quo corruption and citing Citi-
zens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 297 (1981) for 
this interpretation); see also Scott M. Noveck, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Legislative 
Process, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 75, 92–95 (2010) (noting that the notion of “corruption” 
adopted by the Court in McConnell was not a “narrow, motive-based concern about quid 
pro quo” but was rather “a broader conception that encompasses all the ways in which 
wealthy interests achieve disproportionate influence over the legislative process . . . .”). 
137 See supra notes 127–33 and accompanying text. 
138 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
139 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908.  The Court indicated that preventive measures were 
necessary, even though quid pro quo transactions would fall under bribery laws, because 
of evidentiary problems.  Id.  But cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1976) (per cu-
riam) (noting that Congress was entitled to conclude “that contribution ceilings were a 
necessary legislative concomitant to deal with the reality or appearance of corruption”). 
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self-financing opponents.140  In Citizens United, the Court added to this 
list by concluding that the state interest in preventing corruption or 
its appearance was not sufficiently strong to justify denying corpora-
tions the ability to use business revenues to pursue their electoral ob-
jectives.141 
On a few occasions, the Supreme Court has employed an inter-
mediate level of scrutiny in campaign finance cases.  Intermediate 
scrutiny permits the government to demonstrate something less than 
a compelling interest to justify its imposition of restrictions on politi-
cal speech, if the means chosen to further that interest are designed 
in a proper manner.  In First Amendment cases involving restrictions 
on speech, the Supreme Court has often said that the intermediate 
scrutiny test is satisfied if a restriction on speech “furthers an impor-
tant or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest 
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the inciden-
tal restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater 
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”142  The means 
chosen satisfy this “essential” standard if the government’s interest 
“‘would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.’”143 
In campaign finance cases, the Supreme Court appears to have 
used intermediate scrutiny when it evaluated the constitutionality of 
FECA’s limitations on the amount of political contributions that can 
be made to candidates and parties.  For example, in Buckley, the 
Court applied what it referred to as the “lesser demand” of regula-
tions being “closely drawn” to match a “sufficiently important [gov-
ernment] interest.”144  In connection with FECA’s restrictions relating 
to public financing, the Buckley Court also compared the burden 
caused by these restrictions with the burden resulting from state law 
 
140 See Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life Inc., 551 U.S. 449 
(2007); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 
238, 253–63 (1986); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39–58. 
141 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010). 
142 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).  See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 
512 U.S. 622, 661–62 (1994); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798–99 (1989) 
(stating that the appropriate test to apply where political speech is burdened is the “nar-
row tailoring” test). 
143 Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)). 
144 See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387–88 (2000) (discussing the standard 
applied in Buckley); see also FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007) (citing 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44–45, and four later cases repeating the need for strict scrutiny 
whenever “political speech” is burdened); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16, 20, 25–26 (noting that 
expenditure limits require “exacting scrutiny,” and because contribution limits involve 
“only a marginal restriction” on free speech, they are constitutional where they are “close-
ly drawn” to further the weighty interests” of preventing corruption). 
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restrictions on ballot access.  Although the latter were subject to “ex-
acting scrutiny,” the Court was less rigorous with the former because 
public financing is “generally less restrictive of access” than ballot re-
strictions.145  The Court did not expressly label its method “interme-
diate scrutiny” (or anything else), but it appears that it was using in-
termediate scrutiny since it employed a form of heightened scrutiny 
that was clearly not strict scrutiny. 
To summarize, tax law and campaign finance jurisprudence em-
body distinct and generally inconsistent principles regarding the 
form of judicial scrutiny required to test the constitutionality of re-
strictions on speech.  In the First Amendment tax cases, the courts 
gravitate toward the rational relation test because of the presumption 
of constitutionality, and heightened scrutiny is the exception.  In 
contrast, in campaign finance cases, the presumption is that strict 
scrutiny applies, and a lesser form of heightened scrutiny is the ex-
ception.  In the tax cases, it is permissible to discriminate on the basis 
of the identity of the speaker, whereas in campaign finance law it is 
not.  In tax cases, the courts place the burden of proof on the party 
challenging a government restriction on speech, whereas in cam-
paign finance law it is exactly the reverse.  Finally, underlying some 
tax restrictions is the government’s interest in equalizing access to 
government funding and creating a level playing field among partici-
pants in campaigns, whereas the campaign finance cases categorically 
reject equalizing speakers’ resources as a valid government purpose 
for burdening speech in any way.  As a result of these differences, tax 
law provisions that affect speech are far more likely to be upheld than 
are restrictions imposed by campaign finance law. 
IV. TAX LAW FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED 
Parts I–III gave an overview of the general principles of free 
speech doctrine in the areas of tax exemption and campaign finance.  
This Part applies the tax law principles to the restrictions prohibiting 
section 501(c)(3) groups from engaging in political campaign activi-
ty. 
 
145 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 94–96 (finding that such financing served “sufficiently important 
governmental interests and has not unfairly or unnecessarily burdened the political op-
portunity of any party or candidate”). 
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A. What Constitutes a Burden on Speech 
Tax exempt organizations described in section 501(c)(3) of the 
Code must meet both affirmative and negative requirements.  The af-
firmative requirement is that the group has as its purpose one or 
more public goods that the Code and regulations characterize gener-
ically as “charitable.”  These include helping the poor, sick, or disad-
vantaged; promoting education, religion, science, literature, and pub-
lic safety; lessening the burdens of government; and otherwise 
improving social welfare.146  The negative requirements prohibit 
501(c)(3) groups from benefitting any insider (“private inurement”), 
having even one substantial non-exempt purpose, engaging in more 
than insubstantial lobbying, and participating or otherwise interven-
ing in an electoral campaign for public office.147  In addition, an or-
ganization cannot qualify for 501(c)(3) status if it engages in illegal 
activity or violates public policy.148 
At first glance, based upon the traditional tax law constitutional 
jurisprudence discussed in Parts I-III, the absolute prohibition against 
501(c)(3) organizations participating in electoral campaigns would 
seem not to violate the First Amendment.  In a closely analogous situ-
ation, the Supreme Court upheld in Regan v. Taxation with Representa-
tion of Washington the requirement that 501(c)(3) groups not engage 
in substantial lobbying.149  Cammarano v. United States, discussed 
above,150 similarly upheld a prohibition on deducting the cost of lob-
bying that would otherwise have been an ordinary and necessary 
business expense.  The foundation of both decisions was the doctrine 
that fundamental First Amendment rights are not burdened, as a matter 
of constitutional law, by being denied a tax benefit, since the First 
Amendment does not guarantee the right to exercise First Amend-
ment freedoms at the government’s expense.151  Because the right to 
 
146 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(1)(i).  The regulations also 
mention lessening “neighborhood tensions,” prejudice, discrimination, community dete-
rioration, and juvenile delinquency, and promoting human and civil rights.  Id. at            
§ 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(2). 
147 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(b)(1)(iii), (b)(3),(c)(1), 
(c)(3). 
148 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) (noting that a “charitable 
trust may not be illegal or violate established public policy”). 
149 See supra notes 93–94, 99 and accompanying text. 
150 See supra notes 89–91, 99 and accompanying text. 
151 See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington (TWR), 461 U.S. 540, 545 
(1983) (noting that the Supreme Court has never held that Congress is required to pro-
vide subsidies to those who wish to exercise a constitutional right); Cammarano v. United 
States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (holding that the denial of tax deductions was permissi-
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lobby and the right to be involved in political campaigns are both 
core First Amendment values,152 the constitutional analysis should be 
the same in both areas.153 
Taxation with Representation, however, is arguably inapposite be-
cause the organization in that case was permitted to establish a sister 
501(c)(4) organization that could lobby without limit, assuming that 
none of its funds were derived from the 501(c)(3) group.154  Employ-
ing a sister organization this way would enable a 501(c)(3) group to 
conduct its non-lobbying activities (and some lobbying activities as 
well) using money subsidized by the charitable contribution deduc-
tion available to the group’s donors, while its 501(c)(4) counterpart 
could lobby to an unlimited degree without funds thus favored.155  
The 501(c)(3) group’s ability to lobby using an affiliated organization 
was noted by the majority opinion,156 and it was pivotal to the conclu-
sion of Justice Blackmun’s concurrence that the taxpayer’s speech 
rights had not been infringed.157 
This structural arrangement, which became formalized as the al-
ternate channel doctrine, is now considered to be crucial to the out-
come in TWR.158  For the alternate channel to enable the 501(c)(3) 
 
ble where the denial was not due to the organization’s engagement in a constitutionally 
protected activity);. 
152 See TWR, 461 U.S. at 552 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing E.R.R. Presidents Conf. v. 
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137–138 (1961) (stating that lobbying is pro-
tected by the First Amendment)). 
153 See, e.g., Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities:  Hazardous for 
501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for Democracy, 95 GEO. L. J. 1313, 1317 (2007) (arguing that the sub-
sidies justify such regulation).  For the contrary view, see Johnny Rex Buckles, Is the Ban 
on Participation in Political Campaigns by Charities Essential to their Vitality and Democracy?  A 
Reply to Professor Tobin, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1057, 1062 (2008) (arguing that some “electio-
neering” by charities is appropriate, and that there are alternatives to a blanket ban on 
such activities). 
154 See TWR, 461 U.S. at 544 n.6 (noting that it was possible for a 501(c)(3) organization to 
establish a 501(c)(4).  The Service also requires that the lobbying be in furtherance of 
the group’s exempt purpose. 
155 The 501(c)(4) group’s exemption is still a subsidy, according to the Court.  See TWR, 461 
U.S. at 544 (stating that the exemption is the functional equivalent of a “cash grant”).  A 
501(c)(4) group might be less heavily subsidized than a 501(c)(3) organization, however, 
because the latter can combine the benefit of exemption from income tax with that of re-
ceiving funds from donors entitled to the charitable contribution deduction. 
156 See TWR, 461 U.S. at 544–45 n.6. 
157 See id. at 552–53 (stating that “[a] § 501(c)(3) organization’s right to speak is not in-
fringed, because it is free to make known its views on legislation through its § 501(c)(4) 
affiliate without losing tax benefits for its nonlobbying activities”).  The concurrence of 
Justice Blackmun was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. 
158 The majority opinion did not emphasize the alternate channel for lobbying available to 
the plaintiff, but the concurrence considered it indispensable to the outcome in the case, 
and subsequent Supreme Court decisions have adopted the view of the concurrence.  See 
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group to lobby meaningfully, according to the Blackmun concur-
rence, the organization needs to be able to control its affiliated 
501(c)(4) group’s lobbying message.159 
In the area of campaign activity, the existence of an alternate 
channel for the campaign activities of 501(c)(3) organizations is less 
clear-cut than it is for lobbying by such organizations.  Section 527 of 
the Code authorizes the establishment of “political organizations,” 
which are exempt entities created and operated “to influence the se-
lection, nomination, election, or appointment of one or more candi-
dates for public office.”160  Since a 501(c)(3) group is prohibited from 
creating an affiliated section 527 political organization to engage in 
campaign activities on its behalf,161 it seems to be denied the type of 
sister organization crucial to Taxation with Representation’s validation 
of the lobbying limitation. 
Section 501(c)(3) organizations are, however, permitted to estab-
lish one or more sister 501(c)(4) groups, and the latter are permitted 
to participate in campaigns as long as they remain primarily dedicat-
ed to their core social welfare mission.162  A 501(c)(4) group can thus 
provide a channel for a 501(c)(3) organization’s electoral projects.  
Yet the 501(c)(4) alternative channel for campaign activity is not the 
exact equivalent of the 501(c)(4) channel for lobbying activity be-
cause 501(c)(4) groups are subject to a quantitative limit on their 
campaigning, in contrast to their lobbying, because campaigning is 
not considered social welfare.163  The 501(c)(4) group may be further 
limited because all of its activities not classified as social welfare, e.g., 
commercial and private activities, must be aggregated and the total 
compared to the group’s social welfare activities to determine if the 
 
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991) (pointing out that a party is not prevented from 
carrying out practices that fall outside the scope of activities for which funds were given, 
but that “they merely require that the grantee keep such activities separate and distinct 
from Title X activities”); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 400 (1984) (stat-
ing that broadcasting stations could establish “affiliate” organizations that use the same 
facilities to editorialize without using federal funds).  Several appellate and district courts 
have similarly interpreted TWR.  See Miriam Galston, Campaign Speech and Contextual Anal-
ysis, 6 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 100, 113–17 (2007) (summarizing the importance of the 
alternate channel option in TWR and subsequent cases). 
159 See TWR, 461 U.S. 540, 553 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“It hardly answers one 
person’s objection to a restriction on his speech that another person, outside his control, 
may speak for him.”). 
160 I.R.C. § 527(e)(1)–(2) (2006). 
161 See S. REP. NO. 93–1357, at 30 (1974). 
162 See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text. 
163 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)–1 (1987) (stating that the “promotion of social welfare” 
does not include the “direct or indirect participation or intervention in political cam-
paigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office”). 
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group retains its primary focus on its exempt mission.164  The oppor-
tunity for a 501(c)(3) organization to participate in campaigns 
through a sister 501(c)(4) group is thus correspondingly circum-
scribed.  Finally, under some circumstances, a 501(c)(4) group may 
be required to pay tax on the amount it spends on campaigning.165 
Thus, the 501(c)(4) alternate channel for 501(c)(3) groups that 
wish to influence elections may provide the 501(c)(3) groups with a 
less extensive alternate channel than was available to the plaintiffs in 
Taxation with Representation.  At the same time, 501(c)(4) groups are 
themselves permitted to create affiliated section 527 political organi-
zations.  A 501(c)(3) group is thus permitted to have a sister 
501(c)(4) organization that can engage in some campaign activity it-
self and can have an affiliated 527 organization devoted exclusively to 
participation in campaigns.166  Is this Rube Goldberg arrangement 
likely to satisfy the constitutional requirements of the alternate chan-
nel test?  More than one commentator has argued that requiring a 
church to speak through layers of affiliated organizations robs the in-
stitution of the ability to express its views itself, i.e., with a religious 
voice.167 
No Supreme Court decision addresses this question directly.168  
The closest the Cammarano decision comes is the assertion, made by 
Justice Douglas in his concurrence, that he would consider the denial 
of a business deduction for lobbying expenses to be a penalty if Con-
 
164 See supra note 29. 
165 See I.R.C. § 527(f)(1) (2006); see also supra note 30. 
166 See 2002 CPE, supra note 34, at 477–78 (providing an example of how this process would 
work). 
167 See NINA J. CRIMM & LAURENCE H. WINER, POLITICS, TAXES, AND THE PULPIT:  
PROVOCATIVE FIRST AMENDMENT CONFLICTS 281 (2011) (noting that a 501(c)(4) “alterna-
tive may not be similarly availing for their religious messages”); Kemmitt, supra note 25, at 
173 (arguing that requiring a church to communicate through a different entity would 
mean that “the church would be stripped of its religious voice”).  Kemmitt mistakenly be-
lieves that only the church-related PAC, and not the church-related 501(c)(4), can en-
gage in campaign activity.  See id. at 161.  Thus, the speaker is not as far removed from the 
church as Kemmitt believes and, under TWR, the 501(c)(3) organization must be able to 
control the 501(c)(4)’s speech.  Nonetheless, as Kemmitt observes, clergy members can-
not endorse candidates from the pulpit nor otherwise support specific candidates in their 
capacity as head of the church.  Id. at 173.  See also CRIMM & WINER, supra, at 4–8 (speak-
ing through a 501(c)(4) organization might deprive a house of worship of its ability to 
convey a political message as a religious entity). 
168 Precisely this issue was under review in Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, however, and the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the political prohibition 
was constitutional, inter alia, because the plaintiff could establish a 501(c)(4) group that 
could set up an affiliated PAC.  211 F.3d 137, 143–44 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  The Court of Ap-
peals reached this holding even though it assumed, wrongly, that 501(c)(4) groups were 
themselves barred from campaign activity.  Id. at 143. 
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gress were to deny a taxpayer that lobbies all business deductions, 
and not just a deduction for lobbying expenses.169  For the majority in 
that case, the taxpayers’ speech rights were not burdened merely be-
cause they had to pay for lobbying “out of their own pockets.”170  The 
majority opinion in Taxation with Representation struck the same note 
as Justice Douglas, observing that TWR was not being denied a cha-
ritable contribution deduction for its non-lobbying activities.171  Al-
though it noted that there was some burden involved in setting up a 
501(c)(4) group,172 the Court concluded nonetheless that Congress 
had not “infringed any First Amendment rights or regulated any First 
Amendment activity.”173 
These two cases thus suggest that the Supreme Court should be 
quite deferential to Congress when assessing the threshold issue, i.e., 
whether speech has been burdened as a matter of constitutional law.  
They imply that an organization’s speech rights would be infringed 
only if it were prevented from engaging in First Amendment activity 
absolutely as a condition of receiving the tax exemption to which it was 
otherwise entitled.174  However, as noted above, the Taxation with Re-
presentation decision has been interpreted by later cases to say that the 
taxpayer’s speech rights would be infringed if there were no alternate 
channel for the exercise of those rights.175  Cammarano and Taxation 
with Representation (as interpreted by later cases) thus may advance 
different accounts of what constitutes a burden on political speech.  
Further, Taxation with Representation’s less deferential approach sheds 
little light on the type of affiliation that will satisfy the alternate chan-
nel test beyond its assertion that the exempt organization must be 
able to control the content of the affiliated organization’s lobbying 
speech. 
By themselves, then, these cases do not definitively answer the 
“Rube Goldberg” question.  A recent decision of the Roberts Court 
suggests—although it does not guarantee—that the Supreme Court 
will not find the current campaign prohibition for 501(c)(3) organi-
zations an infringement on the organizations’ free speech.  Ysursa v. 
Pocatello Education Association involved a challenge to an Idaho law 
 
169 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 515 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
170 Id. at 513. 
171 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983). 
172 Id. at 544 n.6. 
173 Id. at 546. 
174 See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 395 (1984) (finding a regulation over-
broad where it includes private broadcasters that do not take a partisan stand in its pro-
hibition). 
175 See supra notes 154–158 and the accompanying text. 
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prohibiting any public employer (state or local) from providing a 
payroll deduction to facilitate their employees’ ability to make pay-
ments to their union’s PAC.176  The District Court concluded that 
Idaho’s refusal to provide a payroll deduction for political contribu-
tions for state employees was not an abridgement of the unions’ 
speech because Idaho was under no obligation to incur the cost of 
such a program.177  However, it pronounced the State’s ban on local 
governments providing such a payroll deduction unconstitutional be-
cause no state subsidy was involved at the local level.178  Only the latter 
part of the ruling was appealed to the Court of Appeals, which 
upheld the decision of the lower court.179 
The Supreme Court reversed.  Although the constitutionality of 
the prohibition as it affected the state government was no longer be-
ing challenged, the Court nonetheless reviewed the issue and re-
peated the lower court’s reasoning that Idaho was under no obliga-
tion to “enhance” unions’ political speech nor “aid” them “in their 
political activities” by means of a payroll deduction.180  The Court 
supplemented the lower court’s reasoning by noting that Idaho had 
an “interest in avoiding the reality or appearance of government fa-
voritism or entanglement with partisan politics.”181  The Court then 
used the latter rationale to justify the State’s ban on local govern-
ments providing a payroll deduction for contributions to a union 
PAC, even though local government payroll deductions cost the state 
nothing and, according to the unions, could not be considered a 
“subsidy” by the State.182 
In Ysursa, the Supreme Court accepted as fact that “‘unions face 
substantial difficulties in collecting funds for political speech without 
using payroll deductions.’”183  Despite this finding, the Court asserted 
that there was no infringement on the unions’ political speech and, 
thus, that the Idaho law should be reviewed using the rational basis 
test.184  To support its position, the Court repeatedly cited Taxation 
with Representation, which had also concluded that the economic bur-
den caused by the restriction at issue was not of constitutional signi-
ficance.  The Court in the earlier case argued that 
 
176 See Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 1093, 1096 (2009). 
177 Id. at 1097. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at 1098. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 1101. 
183 Id. at 1098 (quoting Menken v. Emm, 503 F.3d 1050, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
184 Id. 
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[a]lthough TWR does not have as much money as it wants, and thus can-
not exercise its freedom of speech as much as it would like, the Constitu-
tion does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to 
realize all the advantages of that freedom.185 
These two decisions involving free speech reach the same outcome as 
the Supreme Court’s rulings in connection with the free exercise 
prong of the First Amendment:  an organization’s loss of revenue as a 
result of revocation of its exemption “is not constitutionally signifi-
cant.”186 
The Supreme Court in Ysursa relied exclusively on the majority 
opinion in Taxation with Representation, which, as was noted earlier,187 
appears more deferential to Congress than was Blackmun’s concur-
rence.  Ysursa thus suggests that the Roberts Court may be as willing 
as most previous Supreme Courts to find political speech unbur-
dened as a constitutional matter when the effect of legislation deny-
ing an organization a tax-favored status is to place it in a more bur-
densome economic position. 
The reasoning in Massachusetts Citizens for Life is consistent with 
these precedents.  The Supreme Court in that case invalidated a 
campaign finance law that required a corporate 501(c)(4) group to 
fund certain of its campaign activities by using an affiliated political 
action committee (PAC), largely basing its conclusion on the admin-
istrative burden and related costs that the 501(c)(4) group would 
thereby experience.188  Although on the surface the Court’s decision 
may seem inconsistent with the alternate channel reasoning in Taxa-
tion with Representation, in point of fact the Court in Massachusetts Citi-
zens for Life went out of its way to distinguish Taxation with Representa-
tion on the ground that the alternate channel procedure blessed in 
the earlier case “would infringe no protected activity, for there is no 
right to have speech subsidized by the Government.”189  Massachusetts 
Citizens for Life, in contrast, involved a direct restriction on the cam-
paign activity of a nonprofit under the campaign finance regime. 
 
185 Regan v. Taxation with Representation (TWR), 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
186 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 391–92 (1990); see also 
Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 142 (2000) (citing Jimmy Swaggart Ministries 
and Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 700 (1989) to justify upholding the political 
prohibition for 501(c)(3) organizations); Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 700 
(1989) (pointing out that any other rule would impede the operation of the tax system) . 
187 Supra note 158. 
188 FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 241–42, 264–65 (1986). 
189 Id. at 256 n.9. 
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At least two appellate courts have issued similar rulings.  In Ameri-
can Society for Association Executives v. United States, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia said that the rational relation 
test should be applied to section 162(e)’s denial of business deduc-
tions for lobbying expenses, despite the provision’s potential eco-
nomic impact on 501(c)(6) organizations and their members, be-
cause they were free to avoid the problems complained of by setting 
up two 501(c)(6) organizations, one of which would not lobby at 
all.190  Citing Taxation with Representation, the court continued, “If this 
option is available, the treatment of lobbying contested here is sub-
ject only to ‘rational basis’ scrutiny, and, as we shall see, handily sur-
vives.”191  Similarly, in Mobile Republican Assembly v. United States, the 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality 
of a disclosure provision for section 527 political organizations.192  Re-
lying on Taxation with Representation, the Eleventh Circuit said that, 
“[t]he fact that the organization might then engage in somewhat less 
speech because of stricter financial constraints does not create a con-
stitutionally-mandated right to the tax subsidy.”193 
Based upon the reasoning in the preceding Supreme Court and 
appellate court decisions, the current tax law prohibition on 
501(c)(3) groups participating in political campaigns is likely to be 
understood as creating a potential economic burden on the groups’ 
election-related speech that nonetheless does not create a corres-
ponding constitutional burden. 
The prohibition against campaign activity by charities might still 
be unconstitutional if it were seen as involving content discrimination 
by virtue of targeting “political” speech.  A challenge of this kind is 
unlikely to succeed, however.  In Cammarano, the Supreme Court re-
jected the charge that the denial of a business deduction for the cost 
of lobbying was content based because it targeted lobbying, asserting 
instead that the provision in question was a “[n]ondiscriminatory 
denial of [a] deduction” that was clearly not part of an attempt to 
suppress specific ideas.194  The Ysursa Court similarly rejected the 
claim that the Idaho statute prohibiting payroll deductions for con-
 
190 195 F.3d 47, 50–51 (D.C. Cir. 1999).  See infra note 223 and accompanying text (describ-
ing the operation of section 162(e)). 
191 Id. at 50. 
192 353 F.3d 1357, 1362 (11th Cir. 2003). 
193 Id. at 1361.  The court also said that it was following TWR, in which the Supreme Court 
“analyzed the [unconstitutional] condition within the context of the overall tax scheme, 
rather than as a separate provision or penalty” in response to TWR’s claim that the lobby-
ing restriction was an unconstitutional condition.  Id. 
194 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959). 
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tributions to union PACs was content-based because of its impact on 
political speech.195 
In sum, the threshold inquiry into the existence of a burden re-
sulting from the tax law’s political prohibition is likely to conclude 
that no such burden exists because 501(c)(3) groups have a signifi-
cant alternate channel for their campaign activities, economic bur-
dens do not necessarily constitute legal burdens as a matter of consti-
tutional law, and restrictions affecting the entire category of 
campaign speech are not considered content discrimination. 
B.  The Political Campaign Prohibition Scrutinized 
Based upon the preceding, the tax law political campaign prohibi-
tion should be reviewed using the rational relation test.  This test is 
satisfied if government action is directed toward a legitimate govern-
ment interest and the means chosen is rationally related to that 
goal.196 
The Congressional reports in 1954 are silent as to the reason the 
political prohibition was added to the Code.  Nonetheless, the intent 
of Congress can be gleaned from the concerns that led Congress to 
hold hearings on the subject of charities’ advocacy activities in the 
preceding decade.  A limitation on campaign activity by charities had 
been proposed in Congress in 1934, but not enacted.  Prior to 1954, 
the IRS had sometimes taken the position that political activity 
should not be subsidized through the Code, and there were a few 
judicial decisions supporting that position.197  These precedents reveal 
a general policy against permitting tax benefits to subsidize campaign 
spending indirectly as well as concern about charities funding cam-
paign activity with deductible contributions.  To the extent that 
avoiding political campaigns subsidized through the tax code is the 
goal of the political prohibition for 501(c)(3) groups, the means cho-
 
195 See Ysura v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 1093, 1099 (2009) (“Idaho does not suppress 
political speech but simply declines to promote it through public employer checkoffs for 
political activities.”); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192–93 (1991) (rejecting plain-
tiffs’ allegation of content-based regulation of speech because of the federal govern-
ment’s refusal to allow Title X funds to be used for abortion counseling or even counsel-
ing that mentioned abortion).  The dissent disagreed with the majority on this point, see 
id. at 209 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and it is difficult to imagine what would be content-
based regulation if the regulation in Rust does not qualify. 
196 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington (TWR), 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983) 
(explaining the “rational basis” standard applied to statutory classifications). 
197 See the history described in Murphy, supra note 26, Colinvaux, supra note 26, and William 
P. Streng, The Federal Tax Treatment of Political Contributions and Political Organizations, 29 
TAX LAWYER 139, 142–43 (1976). 
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sen are reasonably related to the end.198  The prohibition may not be 
the least restrictive means of achieving that objective, since it does 
more than prevent charitable contributions from being used to sup-
port campaign activities.199  In particular, as some have suggested, re-
quiring 501(c)(3) groups to set up a separate segregated account 
funded only with sums raised for which the contribution deduction 
was not claimed would enable such groups to participate in cam-
paigns without dollars benefiting from the contribution subsidy.  Be-
cause of this, Professor Benjamin Leff has recently argued that the 
501(c)(3) political prohibition could be unconstitutional “to the de-
gree it goes beyond advancing a concern with expenditure equi-
ty . . . .”200  However, Leff also cautions that a mechanism used to allo-
cate the cost of campaign activity to an affiliated entity would have to 
take into account hidden costs, such as some portion of the expense 
of developing and maintaining the 501(c)(3) group’s credibility, in 
order to be completely accurate.201  This type of sophisticated analysis 
is not, however, necessary because the rational basis test does not re-
quire the government to employ the least restrictive means to achieve 
its goal. 
A second possible rationale, one advanced by the Ysursa Court, is 
the government’s interest in not supporting or becoming entangled 
with partisan activities.202  This rationale does not seem applicable in 
relation to exempt organizations, however, because the Code prohi-
bits political intervention only in connection with 501(c)(3) groups, 
whereas other organizations exempt under 501(a) are not included 
in the ban.203  In addition, Congress enacted section 527 to provide 
exempt status for the income of organizations created to influence 
electoral campaigns and to favor donors to such organizations by re-
moving their gift taxation exposure for large contributions.204  Thus, 
 
198 The fact that certain veterans’ groups can engage in political campaigns, yet receive de-
ductible contributions, does not undermine the rationality of the decision to prevent 
charities from intervening in campaigns.  The government is free to provide tax subsidies 
selectively to achieve purposes it deems beneficial.  See supra notes 87, 93. 
199 See infra notes 200–201, 207, and accompanying text. 
200 Benjamin M. Leff, “Sit Down and Count the Cost”:  A Framework for Constitutionally Enforcing 
the 501(c)(3) Campaign Intervention Ban, 28 VA. TAX REV. 673, 686 (2009); see also Chris 
Kemmitt, supra note 25 (arguing that under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA), churches should be permitted to engage in political campaign activity as long as 
they do not use contributions tax deductible under section 170 of the Code). 
201 See Leff, supra note 200, at 708–14. 
202 See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
203 See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text. 
204 See I.R.C. § 527 (2006). 
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existing tax law does not seem to reveal concern with governmental 
neutrality toward campaign activity. 
It is possible to distinguish the cases in which Congress allows ex-
empt status for groups engaged in campaigns on the grounds that the 
groups are not entitled to receive deductible contributions, as are 
501(c)(3) organizations subject to the political prohibition.205  How-
ever, this would be a quantitative distinction at most, which fits better 
with a subsidy rather than an entanglement rationale for the political 
prohibition.  An entangled argument might, however, be based upon 
the observation, made by Professor Johnny Rex Buckles, that because 
the charitable contribution deduction favors more affluent taxpayers, 
permitting charities to engage in campaigns would result in the tax 
code favoring the electoral preferences of the more affluent over 
those of the less affluent, as well.206 
The legislative history of section 527 political organizations, which 
specifically denies 501(c)(3) groups the ability to establish a 527 
group,207 suggests another possible rationale underlying the prohibi-
tion.  Congress could easily have authorized 501(c)(3) groups to es-
tablish affiliated 527 groups subject to restrictions precluding the 
former groups from funding the latter groups with funds derived 
from deductible contributions, but it chose not to.  This suggests that 
preventing political activities from being funded with deductible con-
tributions was not the exclusive rationale for preventing 501(c)(3) 
groups from political intervention.  The twin prohibitions against 
campaign intervention and establishment of a 527 group may also re-
flect a belief that charitable exemption and partisan politics are in-
compatible. 
This last explanation is consistent with the fact that the rationale 
for exempting 501(c)(3) groups from federal income tax and for al-
lowing contributors to them a charitable contribution deduction in 
the first place is to encourage the existence and viability of associa-
tions dedicated to particular public purposes enumerated in the 
Code and elaborated in the Treasury regulations.208  Section 501 of 
 
205 See Johnny Rex Buckles, Not Even A Peep:  The Regulation of Campaign Activity by Charities 
through Federal Tax Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1071, 1081 (2007) (noting that “the electoral 
politics of charities favored by the rich would likely receive a disproportionately large sub-
sidy were the prohibition of electioneering repealed”). 
206 See id. (noting that the progressive income tax rates result in a greater subsidy of high in-
come earners than of lower income ones). 
207 See supra note 161. 
208 See supra notes 146–47 and the accompanying text; see also Tiffany Keb, Comment, Redefin-
ing What it Means to be Charitable:  Raising the Bar with a Public Benefit Requirement, 86 OR. L. 
914 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:4 
 
the Code is not simply a federal version of state nonprofit laws, which 
permit entities to organize as nonprofit organizations as long as they 
are not established for a pecuniary purpose and do not distribute 
their revenues to private persons (other than a permitted class of be-
neficiaries).  Rather, section 501(c) targets specific categories of pub-
lic purpose that lawmakers have determined should be encouraged 
through a system of tax exemption and, in some instances, charitable 
contribution deduction.209  This would appear to be precisely the type 
of project selection that the Supreme Court has validated in the past 
in public funding cases.210 
The prohibition against political intervention also can be justified 
as a corollary of the meaning of public purpose, i.e., that pursuit of a 
public purpose is not consistent with involvement in political cam-
paigns on a partisan basis.  The Service’s interpretation of the politi-
cal prohibition does not bar 501(c)(3) organizations from campaign 
activity absolutely; rather it permits campaign activity that is nonparti-
san, such as voter mobilization not favoring a specific political party 
or candidate.  Nor, as discussed above, does it prohibit other election 
 
REV. 865, 866 (2007) (arguing that charities should have to demonstrate their public 
benefit to be entitled to exemption). 
209 It is possible to view section 501(c)(4) as describing any nonprofit organization with a 
public purpose that does not fit into another subsection of section 501(c).  See JAMES J. 
FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS:  CASES AND MATERIALS 990 
(3d ed. 2006) (asserting that “[a]s a practical matter . . . § 501(c)(4) has become the de-
fault choice (‘dumping ground’?) for organizations that fail to make the grade” as chari-
ties).  While it is true that the meaning of “social welfare” in section 501(c)(4) is broad, 
not every nonprofit group that seeks 501(c)(4) status succeeds.  See, e.g., Contracting 
Plumbers Co-op. Restoration Corp. v. United States, 488 F.2d 684, 685–87 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(finding that a non-profit organization is not exempt even though its activities are “com-
mendable” because it “provides substantial and different benefits to both the public and 
its private members . . . .”); Rev. Rul. 77–273, 1977–2 C.B. 195 (stating that nonprofit or-
ganizations that provide security services do not qualify for exemption); Rev. Rul. 61–158, 
1961–2 C.B. 115–16 (holding that a charitable organization that funds its operations by 
holding a weekly lottery is not entitled to an exemption); see also John Francis Reilly, 
Carter C. Hull, & Barbara A. Braig Allen, IRC 501(c)(4) Organizations, in IRS, EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION 
PROGRAM FOR FY 2003, at I–1, I–9 to I–12 (2002); Miriam Galston, Vision Service Plan v. 
U.S.:  Implications for Campaign Activities of 501(c)(4)s, 53 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 165, 166–
67 (2006) (discussing prior cases finding certain 501(c) organizations non-exempt be-
cause one of their non-exempt activities were substantial in nature). 
210 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193–95 (1991) (noting that “[t]he Government can, 
without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activi-
ties is believed to be in the public interest . . . [and it may choose] to fund on activity to 
the exclusion of the other.”); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 399–400 (1984); 
see also Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 547–48 
(1963) (rejecting the organization’s equal protection challenge, stating that the substan-
tial lobbying provision was part of Congress’s legitimate tax classification function). 
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related activities that are conducted on a nonpartisan basis, such as 
candidate forums and voter education materials.211  Clearly, some ex-
empt organizations are convinced that they can further their exempt 
purposes more effectively by supporting or opposing particular can-
didates for public office than without such actions, and they may be 
correct in some instances.  In rejecting this approach, the Service ex-
plained that “support of a candidate for public office necessarily in-
volves the organization in the total political attitudes and positions of 
the candidate,” in contrast to lobbying, which can be targeted to spe-
cific legislation of direct interest to an organization.212  Thus, assum-
ing the prohibition derives from the meaning of public purpose, the 
means chosen by Congress is rationally related to its goals. 
In short, as long as Congress’s decision not to commit public 
funds to partisan methods of achieving public purposes bestows or 
withholds exemption in a politically neutral fashion, it appears to be 
subject to the rational relation test, whose minimal requirements it 
satisfies without difficulty. 
C. Overbreadth Analysis 
A challenge could be made to the Code’s political campaign re-
strictions on the ground that, as interpreted by the Service, they are 
overbroad because they cover First Amendment protected activities 
that cannot be restricted constitutionally.213  Specifically, litigation 
currently in the lower courts asserts that the statute and regulations 
are overbroad because they include in prohibited campaign activity 
communications other than express advocacy.214  As was explained 
earlier,215 the Service defines the campaign prohibition broadly, to in-
clude communications and other activities that support or oppose 
candidates for public office, and not just those expressly advocating 
the election or defeat of such candidates. 
The overbreadth doctrine operates primarily in situations involv-
ing First Amendment protections.216  One of the main purposes of the 
 
211 See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. 
212 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,233, 1969 GCM Lexis 12, at *8 (Dec. 30, 1969). 
213 See Complaint, Christian Coal., supra note 17, at ¶¶ 72–77; Complaint, Catholic Answers, 
supra note 17, at ¶¶ 38–43.  
214 See Complaint, Christian Coal., supra note 17, at ¶¶ 76–77; Complaint, Catholic Answers, 
supra note 17, at ¶¶ 42–43. 
215 See Part I.A. 
216 See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118 (2003); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense 
of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 859–62 (1991) (describing the other situations in which 
the doctrine can be applied). 
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doctrine is to permit facial challenges to legislation or other govern-
ment actions that may chill the proper exercise of protected rights 
because the government has framed what is prohibited more broadly 
than necessary to achieve its objectives.217  As formulated by the Court 
in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, which upheld a statute limiting state em-
ployees’ ability to engage in partisan campaign activity against a facial 
challenge, the question is whether the overbreadth is “substan-
tial . . . judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”218  
Thus, the Court in Broadrick upheld a statute with provisions prohibit-
ing state employees from engaging in specific acts of political partici-
pation that were likely to be invalidated if challenged separately, on 
an as applied basis, because the vast majority of the statute’s provi-
sions were constitutional.219  An overbreadth challenge can succeed, 
then, only if it can be shown that the Code’s prohibition against polit-
ical intervention applies to a substantial amount of communications 
or other conduct that 501(c)(3) groups should be permitted to en-
gage in under the First Amendment.  The answer to an overbreadth 
challenge thus presupposes an answer to the prior, substantive ques-
tion of the appropriate reach of the Code’s political restrictions. 
Because most precedents in this area involve a challenge to direct 
regulation of protected activity, the government’s action is typically 
analyzed using strict scrutiny and, thus, its action must reflect a com-
pelling state interest and be the least restrictive means of accomplish-
ing its goal.220  However, as was discussed in the previous sections,221 if 
 
217 See Fallon, supra note 216, at 868 n. 94 (suggesting that the overbreadth doctrine is pro-
phylatic, in that the Supreme Court has “discretion to adjust the doctrine’s contours in 
light of their assessment of the doctrine’s practical effects”).  The chill potentially result-
ing from overbreadth is thus different from the potential chill resulting from vagueness, 
since the latter is a consequence of an actor’s uncertainty as to whether conduct is covered 
by the statute, whereas the former is a product of the statute’s excessive scope.  But see id. 
at 904 (arguing that vagueness doctrine “is best conceptualized as a subpart of First 
Amendment overbreadth doctrine”).  For the “analytical link” uniting vagueness and 
overbreadth analysis, see Nationalist Movement v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 558, 585 (1994) (citing 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358–59 (1983); LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1033–35 (2d ed. 1988)). 
218 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973); see also Hicks, 539 U.S. at 118–19 (quoting and applying this 
language).  The Court has so far failed to explain what it means by “substantial” in the 
context of overbreadth.  See Richard Hasen, Measuring Overbreadth:  Using Empirical Evi-
dence to Determine the Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Laws Targeting Sham Issue Advoca-
cy, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1773, 1783 (2001).  Hasen argues that the Court should ascertain 
overbreadth empirically, rather than through speculation.  Id. at 1782–90. 
219 See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 618. 
220 See id. at 611–12 (articulating the strict scrutiny standard applied to First Amendment cas-
es); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 12677, 1278–79 (2007) 
(describing the emergence of the strict scrutiny standard in free speech cases); id. at 1313 
(describing the uneven application of strict scrutiny in free speech cases). 
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it employs traditional tax law constitutional doctrines, the Court 
should be deferential to Congress’s judgment regarding the state in-
terest at stake, i.e., which types of public purposes it wants to encour-
age through the tax code, including whether or to what extent it sees 
such purposes as inconsistent with partisan preoccupations.  The 
claim that the Code’s restrictions are overbroad because they extend 
to more than express advocacy can thus be seen as a back door at-
tempt to import into tax law jurisprudence campaign finance First 
Amendment standards for what political speech can be regulated 
without first demonstrating the necessity of applying those standards 
to Congress’s tax classifications on the merits. 
The failure to demonstrate the threshold question of the legiti-
macy of Congress designing tax exemption categories to limit or ex-
clude partisan activity is likely to be fatal to an overbreadth challenge 
to the Code’s campaign restrictions because the Supreme Court gen-
erally places the burden of demonstrating substantial overbreadth on 
the one who challenges a provision as overbroad.222  Another obstacle 
to limiting the tax law standard to express advocacy is that, if success-
ful, this interpretation could require the Supreme Court to invalidate 
other sections of the Code of long standing.  To take the most ob-
vious example, section 162(e) prohibits a business deduction for the 
cost of lobbying or “participation in, or intervention in, any political 
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public 
office,” even if the cost otherwise qualifies as an ordinary and neces-
sary business expense.223  The political campaign language is virtually 
identical to the counterpart language used in section 501(c)(3).224  
Thus, if campaigning is limited to express advocacy in section 
501(c)(3), the unintended consequence might be to force the Ser-
 
221 See supra Part IV. A–B. 
222 See N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14 (1988) (citing Broadrick, 413 
U.S. at 615).  The sentence in Broadrick states that this is so “particularly where conduct 
and not merely speech is involved . . . .”  Subsequent cases have repeated the need for 
substantial overbreadth before legislation is unconstitutionally overbroad without men-
tioning this qualification.  See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. 
Ct. 1184, 1190 n.6 (2008) (upholding a facial attack on a state’s election law provision as 
violating state political parties’ associational rights); Hicks, 539 U.S. at 118–20 (2003) (in-
sisting that a law be considered substantially broad before invalidating it as overbroad); see 
also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 772 (1982) (advancing the view that overbreadth 
must be substantial in pure speech cases). 
223 I.R.C. § 162(e)(1)(B) (2006). 
224 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006) (“[P]articipate in or intervene in (including the publishing or 
distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any 
candidate for public office.”). 
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vice to permit business deductions for all campaigning except express 
advocacy. 
In sum, the burden of demonstrating that the Service’s current in-
terpretation of campaign activity is overbroad will be on the challen-
gers.  To carry this burden, they must demonstrate, without boot-
strapping from campaign finance jurisprudence, that Congress’s 
power to define which endeavors are charitable and entitled to the 
expenditure of limited public resources is constitutionally limited to 
the narrow definition of campaign activity they favor. 
D.  Vagueness Analysis 
There are, then, considerable obstacles to a successful over-
breadth challenge to legislation.  The prohibition against political 
campaign activity could also be challenged as unconstitutionally va-
gue because neither the statute nor the regulations elaborate with 
precision the nature of the proscribed activity.  The general standard 
set forth in the statute and regulations is developed in a few judicial 
decisions, numerous Revenue Rulings, private letter rulings, and as-
sorted other administrative pronouncements.  Letter rulings and sim-
ilar administrative materials are not precedential guidance, which 
might affect a First Amendment challenge based upon vagueness 
since they cannot be cited in a judicial proceeding as precedent.225  
There is some authority that a court can consult such materials for an 
indication of the Service’s interpretation of a tax provision226 and 
even “accept the reasoning” as persuasive in the absence of authority 
to the contrary.227  Nonetheless, the courts are agreed that taxpayers 
are not entitled to have a court resolve a controversy based upon views 
expressed by the Service to other taxpayers or contained in internal 
administrative documents.228 
Efforts to determine whether legislation is unconstitutionally va-
gue often begin with a general statement of the public policies served 
by the vagueness standard.  First and foremost is the due process con-
 
225 See I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 601.201(l)(6)(2010). 
226 See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. United States, 56 Fed. Cl. 328, 334 (2003) (“Private letter 
rulings represent the IRS’s individual response to a particularized inquiry from a specific 
taxpayer and, as such, have no precedential value. . . . This does not mean, of course, that 
private letter rulings cannot be looked to as a source of guidance in understanding the 
IRS’s interpretation of the tax laws.”) (citing Hannover Bank v. Comm’r, 369 U.S. 672, 
686 (1962))). 
227 See AT&T Corp. v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 209, 213 (2004) (internal quotations omit-
ted). 
228 See Fla. Power & Light, 56 Fed. Cl. at 334 (“[P]laintiff cannot claim entitlement to a tax 
treatment on the basis of a ruling issued to another taxpayer.”) 
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cern that, absent sufficient specificity, government directives will fail 
to afford adequate notice to those affected concerning conduct re-
quired or prohibited.  Frequently cited in this connection is the warn-
ing of Connally v. General Construction Co., that a criminal statute is un-
constitutionally vague if “men of common intelligence must 
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application . . . .”229  
The opinion rested on the observation that due process presupposes 
that substantial fines and long terms of imprisonment may only be 
imposed if the nature of the proscribed conduct has been conveyed 
sufficiently to those potentially affected.230  Equally important is the 
concern that a vague statute lends itself to arbitrary enforcement.231 
Initially, most of the cases citing Connally, involved criminal sta-
tutes and/or loyalty oaths.232  More recently, the Connally pro-
nouncement has been cited in the context of civil laws challenged for 
being unconstitutionally vague.233  The standard is not, however, ap-
plied identically in the two situations.  In the view of the Supreme 
Court, “where a statute imposes criminal penalties, the standard of 
certainty is higher” than in other cases.234 
The Supreme Court also distinguishes the standard applicable to 
vague economic regulations from those applicable to vagueness in re-
strictions limiting speech.  The former can be evaluated using a “less 
strict vagueness test,” whereas “a more stringent vagueness test” will 
 
229 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (citing Int’l Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 (1914) 
(invalidating a criminal antitrust statute)); Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 638 (1914) 
(invalidating a criminal statute prohibiting members of certain agricultural pools from 
acting independently of the pool)); see also generally Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 
104, 108–09 (1972) (discussing the various values that are implicated where a statute is 
vague, including the lack of notice and reasonable opportunity to know what the law 
prohibits). 
230 Connally, 269 U.S. at 391. 
231 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (criticizing a criminal statute for failing to 
provide an adequate standard for the statute’s requirements, thereby vesting almost com-
plete discretion with the police); Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Orange County, 368 
U.S. 278, 283–85 (1961) (invalidating a loyalty oath that was punishable by dismissal from 
public employment and conviction for perjury on the grounds that it was “so vague as to 
deprive [someone] . . . of liberty or property without due process . . . .”); Grayned, 408 
U.S. at 108–09 (“[I]f arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws 
must provide explicit standards for those who apply them.”). 
232 See, e.g., supra note 229; Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 515 (1958) (involving a loyalty 
oath). 
233 See, e.g., Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (in-
volving Treas. Reg. § 1.1501–1(d)(3)). 
234 Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358–59 n.8 (citing Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948)); see 
Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588 (1998) (observing that vague-
ness in a “criminal statute or regulatory scheme” could raise concerns not present when 
selecting recipients for publicly funded (NEA) grants). 
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be applied to the latter.235  Finally, as noted earlier, content-based re-
strictions are subject to the most rigorous scrutiny,236 and vagueness in 
content-based regulations similarly “raises special First Amendment 
concerns because of” the danger that it will chill the targeted 
speech.237 
It is unclear how these authorities would be applied in tax cases 
involving First Amendment issues and what level of scrutiny would be 
employed in analyzing the political campaign prohibition employing 
a vagueness test.  Taxation with Representation is not useful here, since 
the plaintiff association did “not challenge the proscription against 
‘substantial lobbying’ on grounds of vagueness . . . .”238  In National 
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, a public funding case decided in 1998, 
the Supreme Court upheld statutory criteria that had been chal-
lenged as both discriminatory and vague.239  In its decision, the Court 
distinguished the level of scrutiny required for criminal statutes and 
statutes that directly regulate conduct, on the one hand, and statutes 
involving subsidies, on the other.240  It held that “when the Govern-
ment is acting as a patron rather than a sovereign,” a level of impreci-
sion is permitted that would be constitutionally unacceptable in other 
contexts.241 
The campaign prohibition in the Code is clearly not a criminal 
statute since the sanctions for violating it range from a warning let-
ter242 or the imposition of an excise tax243 to revocation of tax exemp-
tion.244  Although tax statutes are not necessarily regulatory statutes, it 
would seem that the campaign prohibition could be characterized as 
 
235 Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99 (1982). 
236 See supra note 123. 
237 Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 871–72 (1997). 
238 See Taxation with Representation of Washington v. Regan (TWR), 676 F.2d 715, 726 n.22 
(D.C. Cir. 1982). 
239 See 524 U.S. at 588–89 (upholding admittedly vague and subjective standards for selecting 
recipients for NEA awards). 
240 See id. at 588.  Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States notes that the “power to tax the exercise 
of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment.”  631 F.2d 1030, 1034 
(D.C. Cir. 1980).  That general proposition, enunciated in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 
U.S. 105, 112 (1943), has since been circumscribed in its application. 
241 See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts, 524 U.S. at 589. 
242 See IRS, PROJECT 302:  POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE (“PACI”) (2006).  
The Service found that, of the cases it closed, sixty-eight percent of the charities investi-
gated had in fact violated the political prohibition.  Almost all these groups were issued 
“written advisories.”  Id. at 18.  At the time the Report was issued, twenty-four percent of 
the examinations were still in progress.  Id. at 12. 
243 See I.R.C. § 4955 (1987). 
244 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)–1(1987), Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(3)(f)(2)(ii) (2008).  How-
ever, as noted by Greg Colvin, criminal sanctions can result from a finding of perjury re-
sulting from an organization’s inaccurate Form 990. 
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regulatory since its purpose is to control conduct rather than to raise 
revenue.  Alternatively, the prohibition can be seen as incidental to 
the statute’s primary purpose of defining what is “charitable” by ex-
cluding activities that are private and partisan in nature.245  So inter-
preted, the prohibition is less regulatory than classificatory, and the 
classification serves the government’s interest in selecting as charities 
those nonprofits most worthy of public encouragement with public 
resources.  The classification of the political prohibition as regulatory 
or not might well determine whether the challenge to it on vagueness 
grounds would be tested under a deferential rational basis standard 
or a form of heightened scrutiny. 
One of the most careful analyses of vagueness in a section 
501(c)(3) context occurs in Big Mama Rag v. United States.246  The 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit characterized 
the standard to be applied in First Amendment cases as “strict,”247 and 
it concluded that the definition of “educational” in the Treasury reg-
ulations was unconstitutionally vague and prone to selective en-
forcement.248  The court found that the regulations’ “full and fair” 
standard was not only too general to be informative; it noted as well 
that the regulations’ reliance on “the reactions of members of the 
public” insured that the test would employ a “necessarily varying and 
unascertainable standard.”249  Moreover, the applicable regulations 
were so confusing that it was unclear to the court whether the organi-
zation in question should have been subjected to the standard in the 
first place.250  The standard thus invited “subjective definitions.”251  
And in fact, the court observed, these ambiguities had enabled the 
Service to apply the “full and fair” test to “only a very few organiza-
tions, whose views are not in the mainstream of political thought.”252  
In particular, the IRS appeared to have previously inappropriately 
applied the full and fair test when assessing the status of a homosex-
ual organization,253 and the association involved in Big Mama Rag cha-
racterized itself as feminist and lesbian.254 
 
245 See supra Part III. B. 
246 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
247 Id. at 1035. 
248 Id. at 1037. 
249 Id. 
250 Id. at 1036–37. 
251 Id. at 1035. 
252 Id. at 1036–37. 
253 Id. at 1037; see also id. at 1040 (referring to the lower court’s “value laden conclusion that 
Big Mama Rag was too doctrinaire”). 
254 Id. at 1032; Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 494 F. Supp. 473, 475 (1979). 
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It seems, then, that the sub-text of the vagueness discussion in Big 
Mama Rag was the court’s concern that the Service was using the reg-
ulations’ malleable standards to suppress certain kinds of ideas it 
found distasteful or contrary to prevailing public norms.255  This pos-
sibility is reinforced by the fact that, in developing its view of the strict 
standard to be applied to vagueness challenges in the First Amend-
ment area, the Big Mama Rag court relied on precedents involving 
content discrimination and the suppression of viewpoints.256  That the 
Big Mama Rag outcome was driven by the court’s response to the Ser-
vice’s practice of disfavoring views with which it did not agree subs-
tantively was also the interpretation of Big Mama Rag adopted by the 
Tax Court in a subsequent case, which upheld the constitutionality of 
Revenue Procedure 86-43,257 the ruling promulgated by the Service to 
supplement the definition of “education” in its regulations after they 
were declared unconstitutionally vague in Big Mama Rag.258 
Clearly, on its face, the political campaign prohibition is not de-
signed to suppress specific viewpoints, since it is not targeted to any 
political party or political orientation.  However, it is possible that the 
standard is not precise enough to afford constitutionally sufficient 
notice to taxpayers attempting to comply with its strictures, nor to 
prevent arbitrary, viewpoint based enforcement.  As for the latter, 
opinions are likely to differ as to the existence of political bias on the 
part of the IRS when it actually enforces the political prohibition.  
Complaints alleging biased enforcement have, in fact, been leveled 
against the agency.259  Responding to such complaints, the Treasury 
 
255 Of course, it is constitutional to deny 501(c)(3) exemption to a group that violates a 
strong public policy.  See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 579 & 605 (1983) 
(upholding the Service’s denial of a charitable exemption to an institution of higher 
learning that discriminated in admissions on the basis of race).  The IRS did not, howev-
er, assert a violation of public policy against Big Mama Rag. 
256 See Big Mama Rag, 631 F.2d at 1034–35. 
257 1986–2 C.B. 729 (1986). 
258 See Nationalist Movement v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 558, 581–83 (1994).  Rev. Proc. 86–43 was 
before the District Court for the District of Columbia Circuit in National Alliance v. United 
States, 710 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  The court in that case declined to rule directly on 
the constitutionality of the Revenue Procedure, but it did note (in dictum) that the four-
part test went a long way toward “reduc[ing]” the vagueness in the “full and fair” test.  Id. 
at 875. 
259 See, e.g., Branch Ministries, Inc. v. Rossotti, 40 F. Supp. 2d 15, 19 (D.D.C. 1999) (“Plaintiffs 
also contend that the IRS selectively prosecuted the Church on the basis of its political 
and/or religious views in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and that the revocation 
violated the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.”); Tobin, su-
pra note 153, at 1315–16 (stating that non-profits have criticized the IRS for subjective or 
political enforcement practices); Art Pine, Inquiry Finds No IRS Wrongdoing in Audits, L.A. 
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2000, at A16 (describing a report that showed that claims by Republicans 
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Inspector General of Tax Administration (TIGTA) conducted an in-
vestigation and gave the Service a clean bill of health in 2005.260  In 
addition, since 2004, the IRS has established and follows a national, 
standardized procedure for identifying and reviewing possible viola-
tions of the political prohibition in each election cycle.  This proce-
dure is known as the “Political Activities Compliance Initiative,” or 
“PACI.”261  The method employed, which is published on the IRS 
website, involves a specially trained team of personnel that reviews all 
referrals alleging a violation of the political prohibition, decides 
which cases should be investigated, forwards them to designated 
agents in the field for investigation, and recommends sanctions when 
violations are found.262  Although these procedures do not guarantee 
lack of bias, the process should reduce the opportunity for viewpoint 
discrimination significantly because it is well documented and the 
method, results, and sanctions are described in detail on the Service’s 
website.263  Although several of the IRS’s determinations have been 
contested by the organizations audited,264 published accounts of these 
cases suggest that there is not a substantial risk of selective or discri-
minatory enforcement. 
Whether the degree of notice of prohibited activities to affected 
parties is constitutionally sufficient is more difficult to assess.  The no-
tice provided to organizations and guidance available to enforcement 
 
that the Clinton Administration was using the IRS to persecute political opponents were 
without merit). 
260 See TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, REVIEW OF THE EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS FUNCTION PROCESS FOR REVIEWING ALLEGED POLITICAL CAMPAIGN 
INTERVENTION BY TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (2005); see also Pine, supra note 259 (de-
scribing a report that cleared such allegations). 
261 See IRS, PROJECT 302:  POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE (2006) (hereinafter 
“2004 PACI Report”), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/final_paci_report.pdf 
(discussing the method used to identify, review, and, where appropriate, sanction 
501(c)(3) groups possibly engaging in prohibited activity in the 2004 election); IRS, 2006 
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE (2007) (hereinafter “2006 PACI Report”).  
The PACI review for the 2008 election cycle is still in progress.  For the reports issued in 
connection with the 2004 and 2006 election cycles and materials related to the 2008 re-
view, see Political Activity Compliance Initiative (2006 Election), IRS, http://www.irs.gov/
charities/charitable/article/0,,id=179738,00.html (last updated Feb. 11, 2011); see also in-
fra note 263. 
262 See, IRS, POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE:  PROCEDURES FOR 501(C)(3) 
ORGANIZATIONS, 1–3 (2006) available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/paci_
procedures_feb_22_2006.pdf.; FINAL REPORT, PROJECT 302, supra note 261. 
263 See Political Campaign Intervention by 501(c)(3) Tax-Exempt Organizations—Securing Com-
pliance, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/charities/article/0,,id=154622,00.html (last updated 
June 14, 2010). 
264 The most difficult situations involve speeches, sermons, and other communications that 
contain multiple messages, some electoral and some not, in a single communication. 
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personnel in connection with the political prohibition is far greater 
than was provided under the full and fair standard at issue in Big 
Mama Rag in at least two respects.  First, the difference between the 
regulations in the two situations is especially clear with respect to the 
extent of vagueness.  In Big Mama Rag, it was not even obvious to the 
court which organizations were subject to the “full and fair” test to 
begin with, and there was no written guidance elaborating the mean-
ing of “full and fair” once the IRS determined that the standard 
should be applied.265  In contrast, there is no ambiguity regarding the 
entities subject to the political prohibition.  Although there are a li-
mited number of judicial decisions applying the prohibition,266 there 
are a dozen Revenue Rulings addressing the meaning of the political 
prohibition, many of which describe and analyze multiple fact pat-
terns.267  The information contained in these sources has been repro-
duced in plain language guides in a wide assortment of publications, 
such as pamphlets, brochures, and memoranda produced by law 
firms and advocacy organizations, many of which are available for 
free on the Internet.268 
That the amount of guidance explaining the political prohibition 
is “significant” does not mean it is optimal.  Optimal would be de-
tailed regulations, replete with illustrations, as exist to determine 
what constitutes lobbying when a section 501(h) election is in ef-
fect.269  At the same time, the fact that creative minds can devise cam-
paign practices not addressed by existing guidance should not con-
demn that guidance as unconstitutionally vague.270  Given the 
 
265 See Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1036–37 (1980) (discussing “[t]he 
uncertainty of the coverage of the ‘full and fairness exposition’ standard . . . .”). 
266 See supra note 31. 
267 See supra notes 31; Kindell & Reilly, supra note 34 (discussing revenue rulings). 
268 Some illustrative examples are a series of advisories produced by the Alliance for Justice 
(AJF), located in Washington, D.C. and are available at:  About Advocacy:  Election Activity, 
ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE (July 18, 2007), http://www.afj.org/for-nonprofits-
foundations/resources-and-publications/about-advocacy-election.html; Resource Center:  
IRS Rules on Election Activities of Charities, OMB WATCH (Jan. 29, 2009), 
http://www.ombwatch.org/node/9627; James Bopp, Jr., Guidelines for Political Activities by 
Churches and Pastors, MINN. CITIZENS CONCERNED FOR LIFE, 
http://www.mccl.org/%20Document.Doc?id=177 (last visited Mar. 27, 2011); James 
Bopp, Jr., Guidelines for Political Activities of Right to Life Organizations, PA. PRO-LIFE FED’N, 
(May 2008), http://www.paprolife.org/2008 Guidelines for Right to Life Organiza-
tions.pdf. 
269 See Treas. Reg. §§ 56.4911–1–§ 56.4911–7 (2009). 
270 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 n.15 (1972) (“It will always be true that 
the fertile legal imagination can conjure up hypothetical cases in which the meaning of 
disputed terms will be in nice question.”) (citing Am. Commc’ns Ass’n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 
382, 412 (1950) (internal quotations omitted)). 
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complexity and variety of methods of political campaigning, not to 
mention the rapidity with which campaigning has evolved with 
changes in technology, this may be a situation in which the constitu-
tional protection afforded speech must take into account “whether it 
would have been practical to draft more precisely.”271  In sum, al-
though the prohibition is enforced through a facts and circumstances 
test, there is a significant amount of precedential guidance to assist 
both organizations that seek to stay on the right side of the line and 
IRS personnel seeking to enforce the standard properly.272 
Second, as important as the quantity of guidance for interpreting 
the political prohibition is the fact that the criteria contained in the 
guidance are largely objective.  For example, the Service’s determina-
tion depends upon such things as whether voting records are distri-
buted on an annual basis at the close of legislative sessions or their 
distribution is timed to an election, whether communications about 
legislative issues are targeted to election periods and concentrated in 
swing states where those issues are identified with specific candidates, 
whether all candidates are invited to candidate forums, whether voter 
guides based upon candidate surveys reproduce the candidates’ 
words accurately, whether partisan voter guides are distributed on the 
organization’s premises or on the public sidewalks outside an organi-
zation’s control, and the like.273  This contrasts with Big Mama Rag, 
where the standard in the regulations required the IRS to determine 
if a newsletter’s articles were “‘full and fair’” “based on an individua-
listic—and therefore necessarily varying and unascertainable—
standard:  the reactions of members of the public.”274 
Some of the criteria contained in the political prohibition are, 
however, subjective.  For example, depending upon the context, the 
IRS will examine whether the format or questions at a candidate fo-
rum reveal bias, whether the questions asked in a candidate survey 
are too concentrated in a single subject area, suggesting bias, or 
whether a communication made on the eve of an election improperly 
conveys a view as to a candidate’s fitness for office.  Considerations 
such as these inject an element of uncertainty into the analysis that 
may be troubling from a First Amendment perspective because, as a 
 
271 Nationalist Movement v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 558, 588 (1994) (citing U.S. Civil Serv. 
Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 578–79 (1973)). 
272 There is also considerable non-precedential guidance in the form of private letter rulings 
issued to individual taxpayers, IRS Fact Sheets, Field Service advisories, PACI reports, and 
Exempt Organizations Continuing Professional Education (CPE) Technical Instruction 
Program essays used for training IRS personnel.   
273 See supra notes 34–38, 60–65, and accompanying text.  
274 Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1037 (1980). 
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practical matter, they may impose a burden of restraint on would-be 
actors during an election who desire to engage in political speech or 
other election related activities.  It is unclear whether the presence of 
criteria requiring the exercise of judgment on the part of the organi-
zations and the Service to this extent would trigger the application of 
heightened scrutiny.  For the reasons that follow, it is likely that the 
level of indeterminacy posed by such criteria would survive heigh-
tened scrutiny, were it employed. 
The fact that the political prohibition does not discriminate on 
the basis of viewpoints and that the scope of the standard is not open-
ended, as were the regulations implicated in Big Mama Rag, suggests 
that the prohibition would be subject to intermediate scrutiny, if the 
rational relation test is deemed too lenient for the vagueness threat 
to political speech posed by the Code’s restrictions on campaign ac-
tivity.  That intermediate scrutiny would be used, rather than strict 
scrutiny, if heightened scrutiny is employed, is also suggested by the 
circumstance that most of the campaign finance cases employing 
strict scrutiny involved criminal sanctions.  For example, in invalidat-
ing the political expenditure cap in Buckley, the Supreme Court noted 
that “[c]lose examination of the specificity of the statutory limitation 
[on independent expenditures] is required where, as here, the legis-
lation imposes criminal penalties in an area permeated by First 
Amendment interests.”275  The Buckley Court characterized vagueness 
in statutes with criminal sanctions as “particularly treacherous.”276  
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Wisconsin Right to Life was similarly 
concerned that the penalty for violating the law was criminal prosecu-
tion and criminal penalties.277  Likewise, for the Citizens United majori-
ty, the “threats of criminal liability and the heavy costs of defending 
against FEC enforcement” facing corporations seeking to engage in 
political activity during elections made the source rules in FECA ana-
logous to prior restraints on protected speech.278  Moreover, the cam-
paign finance cases involved a complete ban on political speech, ac-
 
275 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 40–41 (1976) (per curiam); see also id. at 40 n.47 (rejecting 
the suggestion that to alleviate the vagueness of § 609(e)(1), the Commission should pub-
lish advisory opinions); supra note 234. 
276 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 76. 
277 See FEC v. Wis. Right To Life, Inc. (“WRTL”), 551 U.S. 449, 493 (2007) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (discussing the criminal nature of penalty); see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 
323, 335 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) 
(noting the criminal penalties imposed on unions and corporations for broadcasting 
messages that explicitly refer to a candidate). 
278 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 895 (2010). 
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cording to the Court,279 whereas 501(c)(3)organizations are able to 
engage in political speech either as taxable entities or through ex-
empt affiliates. 
Violations of the political prohibition are not usually subject to 
criminal sanctions.  In the worst case, the IRS could impose revoca-
tion of an organization’s exemption and a civil tax penalty.280  For a 
501(c)(3) group, an excise tax of ten percent of the amount spent on 
communication(s) determined to be campaign intervention could be 
imposed on the organization, and a two and one half percent tax 
could be imposed on the managers who made the decision, unless 
their action was not willful and was due to reasonable cause.281  As the 
IRS’s recent enforcement push reveals, however, revocation is rarely 
proposed and it has only been imposed if violations are flagrant or 
repeated.282  As the PACI Reports also reveal, most organizations 
found to have engaged in prohibited campaign activity have received 
only written advisories, even though the violations included such 
clearly prohibited activities as contributing money to a candidate or 
posting campaign signs on the organization’s premises.283  Even when 
excise taxes have been imposed, the Service frequently refunds the 
tax as well as interest and penalties, if any, if the organization corrects 
the violation.284  Further, revocation relating to one or more years of 
 
279 See WRTL, 551 U.S. at 465. 
280 As Greg Colvin has noted, an exempt organization runs the risk of a criminal violation if 
its Form 990 is found to be fraudulent, but this would involve the intent to characterize its 
activities falsely rather than filing a false return by mistake.  Remarks at the Meeting of 
the Committee on Exempt Organizations of the Section on Taxation of the American Bar 
Association (May 7, 2010). 
281 I.R.C. § 4955(a) (2006).  Under existing interpretations of willfulness and reasonable 
cause, it is unlikely that many decision makers would be subject to the manager’s tax.  See 
Treas. Reg. §§ 53.4955–1(b)(4)–(7) (describing the standard for “knowing,” “willfulness,” 
and “reasonable cause”).  For a description of the sanctions imposed on violations occur-
ring in the last three election cycles, see the 2004 and 2006 PACI reports, supra note 261 
and accompanying text.  Note, however, that the amount of the excise taxes can be 
doubled to one-hundred percent and fifty percent, for the organization and managers re-
spectively, if the violation is not corrected.  See I.R.C. § 4955(b) (2006).  Correction 
means “recovering part or all of the expenditure to the extent recovery is possible, estab-
lishment of safeguards to prevent future political expenditures, and where full recovery is 
not possible, such additional corrective action as is prescribed by the Secretary by regula-
tions.”  I.R.C. 4955(f)(3) (2006). 
282 See 2004 PACI Report and 2006 PACI Report, supra note 261; Branch Ministries, Inc. v. 
Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (revoking the exemption of a church that 
had placed a full-page advertisement in two national newspapers urging Christians not to 
vote for Bill Clinton for President). 
283 See 2004 Report and 2006 PACI Report, supra note 261, at 18. 
284 See Catholic Answers, Inc. v. United States, No. 09-cv-670-IEG (AJB), 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 96070, at *7–8 (discussing IRS refund); Complaint, Christian Coal., supra note 17, 
at ¶¶ 43–44 (mentioning IRS refund).  Numerous commentators have remarked on the 
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an organization in no way precludes it from having its exemption res-
tored in exchange for agreeing to abstain from campaign activities.  
All of these considerations bear on how chilled an organization’s 
speech is likely to be as a result of the political prohibition.  Although 
civil fines can impose burdens on the affected entities, the burden is 
qualitatively different from and usually far less extreme than what is 
entailed by criminal sanctions. 
Under the intermediate scrutiny standard of judicial scrutiny, 
Congress would have to demonstrate that the purpose of the political 
prohibition “furthers an important or substantial” interest, is “unre-
lated to the suppression of free expression,” and needs the prohibi-
tion for its goal to be implemented “effectively.”285  All of the interests 
furthered by the political prohibition should be considered substan-
tial:  preventing deductible charitable contributions from being used 
to fund political activities, assuring that only organizations devoted 
exclusively to a charitable mission are selected to benefit from public 
financial support, preventing tax favored charities from dissipating 
their time, energy, and concentration on partisan activities, and pre-
venting charities from engaging in activities with a high risk of fur-
thering the private benefit of individuals and candidates for public 
office. 
The means chosen by Congress to address these concerns may be 
more controversial.  As was noted earlier, if preventing public funds 
from subsidizing campaign activity is seen as the sole government in-
terest, it may be possible to construct a mechanism involving an affi-
liated entity to reduce this risk.286  Even so, it is difficult to predict 
whether the political prohibition would be found constitutionally in-
firm for this reason, given that intermediate scrutiny does not require 
the government to select the least restrictive means for achieving a 
statute’s purpose.  Further, taking into account considerations such 
as keeping charities’ focus on their charitable mission and out of par-
tisan activities, the ability of a 501(c)(3) organizations to partner with 
affiliated 501(c)(4) groups that engage in campaign activity should 
satisfy the standard of being narrowly drawn to achieve the entire 
range of statutory purposes. 
 
lax enforcement by the IRS.  See, e.g., Keith S. Blair, Praying for a Tax Break:  Churches, Polit-
ical Speech, and the Loss of Section 501(c)(3) Tax Exempt Status, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 405, 428–
29 (2009) (discussing statistics suggesting that there is little IRS enforcement). 
285 See supra notes 142–145 and accompanying text (discussing the intermediate scrutiny 
standard). 
286 See the suggestions made by CRIMM & WINER, supra note 167, at 326–27, 328–33; see also 
supra notes 199–201. 
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CONCLUSION 
The preceding analysis is not entirely conclusive.  A direct attack 
on the constitutionality of the tax law prohibition on 501(c)(3) 
groups’ political campaign activity is very unlikely to succeed, even 
though the tax law restriction applies to a far wider range of cam-
paign activities than is permitted for campaign finance regulation of 
political speech.287  As discussed in this Part, the key differences in the 
constitutional analysis of the prohibition under tax law, as compared 
with the counterpart analysis of restrictions under campaign finance 
law, suggest that minimal judicial scrutiny will be applied to the for-
mer and that both the government’s purpose in limiting political ac-
tivity for charities and the means chosen will be found reasonable.  In 
part because of the weakness of an attack on the prohibition, an 
overbreadth challenge is also likely to fail. 
The outcome with respect to a vagueness challenge to the terms 
of the prohibition, as implemented by the IRS, is more uncertain.  
There is the possibility that intermediate scrutiny would be employed, 
rather than the rational relation test, to evaluate the restriction.  In 
that event, it is likely that some, if not all, of the government interests 
discussed in Part IV would be considered substantial.  Some uncer-
tainty exists as to the ability of the political prohibition to qualify as 
narrowly enough drawn to achieve the government’s purposes.  In 
particular, the prohibition’s validity in this respect may turn on 
whether a reviewing court accepts the validity of linking the prohibi-
tion to goals in addition to preventing deductible charitable contri-
butions from financing campaign activity.  Of course, if the Court 
were to invalidate the political prohibition because it fails to provide 
sufficient notice to the entities affected by the regulation or the gov-
ernment officials tasked with enforcing the regulations, the IRS 
would be able to promulgate more detailed regulations, along the 
model of the lobbying regulations for 501(c)(3) organizations, to 
correct any deficiencies noted by the Court. 
I would distinguish what I believe is a fair reading of the constitu-
tional tax law jurisprudence from what might happen if the political 
campaign prohibition makes its way to the Supreme Court.  Five of 
the current Justices have made crystal clear their aversion to anything 
that can be construed as interfering with the free exercise of political 
 
287 This Article has confined itself to the constitutional dimensions of the political prohibi-
tion.  For a thorough analysis of the public policy reasons for the prohibition, focusing on 
the dangers that would result were 501(c)(3) groups to engage in campaign activity, see 
Tobin, supra note 153. 
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speech.  It is possible that they could disregard the weight of the pre-
cedents described in this paper, invoking other constitutional doc-
trines, for example, that the government should not be permitted to 
do indirectly what it cannot do directly.  They might argue that Mas-
sachusetts Citizens for Life has superseded Taxation with Representation 
with respect to the constitutionality of requiring certain organizations 
to use an affiliate for campaign activities and dismiss the distinction 
between campaign finance and tax law expressly made by the Su-
preme Court in that case288 as mere dictum pronounced in a footnote.  
In that event, the alternate channel doctrine blessed in Taxation with 
Representation and subsequent Supreme Court cases would no longer 
be good law and exempt organizations, like organizations in general, 
could not have their political speech regulated to a greater degree 
than is permitted by Buckley, as interpreted by Wisconsin Right to Life 
and Citizens United. 
The outcome, if campaign finance constitutional standards are 
applied to tax legislation, is beyond the scope of this article.289  If the 
political restrictions applying to charities and other exempt organiza-
tions are invalidated, it is likely that the tax code’s prohibition against 
business deductions for the costs of campaigning and lobbying could 
be found unconstitutional as well, since both the restrictions on busi-
ness deductions and the limitations on lobbying by 501(c)(3) organi-
zations were upheld using the identical rationale.  As remote as these 
possibilities may at first seem, given that three Justices are already on 
record as prepared to overrule Buckley itself,290 it would be rash to 
predict what the future will bring. 
 
288 See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 241–42, 256 n.9, 264–65 (1986). 
289 Roger Colinvaux has recently engaged in such an analysis.  He concluded that the tax law 
political prohibition would be upheld even if scrutinized under campaign finance consti-
tutional standards.  Colinvaux, supra note 26, at 17–32. 
290 See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 265–66 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring) 
(stating that Buckley does not provide sufficient protection for First Amendment rights 
with political speech); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 409–10 (2000) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that the ruling of Buckley “ought to be eliminated”). 
